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SHIFTING PARADIGMS OF LAWYER HONESTY
JOHN A. HUMBACH
Another lawyer . . . who deals with a lawyer should not need to exercise
the same degree of caution that he would if trading for reputedly antique
copper jugs in an oriental bazaar.1
Imagine what it would be like to live in a world of truly honest lawyers.
The lawyers in such a world would represent their clients zealously and strive
as mightily as lawyers anywhere to advance their clients‘ legitimate interests.
But, as truly honest lawyers, they would never deliberately distort the truth or
withhold information in an effort to mislead others, nor would they take
advantage of others‘ obvious mistakes. They would never try to persuade others
to believe things that neither they nor their clients believe. On the contrary, the
lawyers in such a world would take pains to ensure that the people they deal
with never have reason to feel deceived, deluded, or betrayed. When in court,
these truly honest lawyers would, at the very least, follow the ethical
requirement to take ―reasonable remedial measures‖ to prevent fraudulent or
criminal conduct related to the proceeding.2 More than that, however, they
would never ―bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue,‖
unless they truly believe (or, at least, they believe that their clients believe) that
there is a basis not merely on the admissible evidence but also in actual fact.3 In
both transactions and in litigation these truly honest lawyers not only would
never engage in conduct involving misrepresentation or other deceit4 but, in
 Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.A., Miami University; J.D., Ohio
State University.
1. Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers’ Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577,
589 (1975).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2009).
3. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2009). The current Model Rules state
that lawyers must have a basis in ―fact‖ for proceeding, id., but it appears this rule is properly
understood to mean ―admissible evidence‖ rather than actual ―fact.‖ For example, a lawyer is
free to assert a privilege or other evidentiary rule in an effort to obtain victory even though the
lawyer knows that the client almost certainly would not prevail on the substance of the law if the
tribunal were apprised of all the relevant facts. Stated differently, a lawyer is not ethically
prohibited from using evidentiary or procedural rules to keep out evidence just because the
lawyer knows that, deprived of the evidence in question, the tribunal will almost certainly reach
a counterfactual conclusion on a critical point. If it looks reasonably possible that a case or issue
can be won on a procedural or evidentiary point, then Rule 3.1 does not prevent the lawyer from
trying to do so just because the lawyer knows that the client‘s basic claim or defense is, in point
of actual fact, without substantive merit. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1
(2009); see also infra text accompanying notes 121–181.
4. Both are currently banned, nominally at least, under Model Rule 8.4(c). MODEL RULES
OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009). However, although the Model Rules language prohibiting
―misrepresentation‖ and ―deceit‖ appears very broad, there seems to be a considerable sentiment
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addition, they would never purposely fail to disclose facts necessary to correct
misapprehensions known to have arisen in the matter.5 They would never seek,
by selective nondisclosures, objections to evidence, or the like, to lead the law
astray.
Our own world is, of course, not such a world. The ABA‘s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct contain a number of prescriptions for honest dealing,6 but
relatively few people outside the legal profession consider the honesty and
ethical standards of lawyers to be very high.7 This is not because most lawyers
are habitual liars, for it is probably true that they are not.8 Rather the distrust of
lawyers almost certainly has more to do with the deliberate efforts of lawyers to
play the societal role that they think they must—a role that they see as intrinsic
to the adversary system. It is a role in which keeping secrets can be more
important than revealing truth,9 loyalty to client-defined objectives is elevated
over commitment to justice,10 the advocate‘s proper function is seen to be

against applying these ―catch-all‖ prohibitions unless the lawyer‘s conduct also falls within a
specific lawyer-code provision that states the elements of an offense. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. c (2000).
5. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009). Actually, the high standard of
candor contained in this rule applies only to lawyer disciplinary matters and applications for
admission to the bar, and its force is substantially undermined by an exception for information
relating to the representation of a client—which is likely to include just about everything
material that the lawyer is likely to know. Id.
6. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 1.2(d), 1.16(b)(3), 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 8.1(b),
8.4 (2009).
7. Gallup polls on honesty and ethics show that Americans place lawyers among the
lowest rated professions. See, e.g., David W. Moore, Nurses Top List in Honesty and Ethics
Poll, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.gallup.com/poll/14236/Nurses-Top-ListHonesty-Ethics-Poll.aspx?. The poor reputation of lawyers for honesty and ethics appears,
moreover, to have been fairly durable, at least in the recent past. See John A. Humbach, Abuse
of Confidentiality and Fabricated Controversy: Two Proposals, 11 PROF‘L LAW. 1, 1 (Summer
2000).
8. At any rate, my own experience (albeit undocumented) is that lawyers‘ professional
propensity to avoid outright falsehoods is, if anything, well above the average.
9. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009) (A lawyer shall not ―fail
to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 [confidentiality].‖)
(emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) (―[A] lawyer shall abide
by the client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation . . . .‖). By ―justice‖ I
am referring to legal justice, and I mean to set aside for the present purposes the difficult
questions that can arise when laws are perceived to be morally unjust. These latter questions are
important, to be sure, but the present focus is on the tensions that result when lawyers think they
must endeavor to defeat the outcomes that the substance of the law prescribes. See WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 138 and passim (1998)
(arguing that lawyers can avoid promoting legal injustice by taking a broader ―contextual‖ view
when making legal-ethics judgments).
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winning rather than doing what is ―right‖11—especially if doing what is right
would require the lawyer to become judge and jury of the lawyer‘s own client.
Lawyers do not generally view it as part of their professional role to be
personally responsible for getting at the truth of the matter but, rather, to
persuade others to believe or accept whatever interpretation of the raw evidence
is most beneficial to the interests of their own clients. While telling lies is
definitely out of bounds,12 taking advantage of others‘ mistakes and
misapprehensions is not, and trying to bend others‘ perceptions to the client‘s
best advantage is seen to be at the heart of good advocacy.
The low public opinion of lawyers‘ honesty and ethical standards cannot,
moreover, be blamed on the fact (if it is a fact) that lawyers are ignorant of or
ignore the prescriptions of the applicable ethical codes.13 The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, despite their various exhortations to honesty, leave
ample room for an approach to adversary advocacy in which getting at the truth
can be a lesser value than victory on the client‘s behalf. This appears, at any
rate, to be the accepted understanding of portions of the Model Rules that bear
on the lawyer‘s duty of diligence,14 confidentiality,15 scope of representation
(the lawyer‘s role),16 meritorious claims and contentions,17 and truthfulness in
11. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009) (―A lawyer should .
. . take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client‘s cause or
endeavor.‖); MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2009) (―[L]awyers usually defer
to the client regarding such questions as . . . concern for third persons who might be adversely
affected.‖); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 (2000) (―[A]
lawyer may take any lawful measure within the scope of representation that is reasonably
calculated to advance the client‘s objectives as defined by the client . . . .‖) (emphasis added);
SIMON, supra note 10, at 26 (observing that, under the dominant view ―the client has a right to
the type of lawyering it prescribes, even when such lawyering leads to injustice for others‖).
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2009); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (2000) (setting out a lawyer‘s obligations regarding
―False Testimony or Evidence‖).
13. While it may be true that many or most lawyers are not intimately familiar with the
exact language of the Model Rules or other applicable codes, it is probably fair to say that most
lawyers know their general substance, especially as regards the questions of honesty and truth to
be considered in this article.
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2009) (―A lawyer should . . .
take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client‘s cause or endeavor.
A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with
zeal in advocacy upon the client‘s behalf.‖); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 7 (1980) (―A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
Law‖). Even though in the ABA‘s current Model Rules the reference to ―zealous‖ advocacy is
now in a comment rather than a rule, MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009),
its message remains one that most lawyers take seriously.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). Rule 1.6 operates as a qualifier to
other Model Rules and comments that, in their direct terms, would otherwise call for a higher
standard of candor and ―honesty.‖ See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b), 8.1(b)
(2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 2, 1.16 cmt. 3 (2009).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.1.2(a) (2009) (―[A] lawyer shall abide by a
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statements to others.18 Rules such as these seem to assume, if not actually
prescribe, a vision of the adversary system in which lawyers work singlemindedly on behalf of their clients—a system in which lawyers can be trusted
to pursue their clients‘ interests vigorously but cannot, and should not, be
trusted in much else.
Moreover, instead of prescribing a single standard of honesty for all
situations, the Model Rules contain a multi-standard hierarchy of candor in
which lawyers are required to be more honest in some situations than in
others.19 For example, lawyers have a higher duty of candor to the courts than
they do to each other or to the public generally: To the ―tribunal‖ the lawyer has
a duty to take ―reasonable remedial measures‖ whenever the lawyer knows that
anybody, client or otherwise, intends to engage in or does engage in fraudulent
or criminal conduct related to the proceeding,20 and to take these measures
―even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.‖21 By contrast, when dealing with other lawyers or the public
generally, the lawyer‘s affirmative duty to speak is limited to cases of client
fraud or criminality, and even then, the duty is subject to the confidentiality
strictures of Rule 1.6.22
The Model Rules also prescribe a third level of honesty and candor,
applicable with respect to disciplinary matters and admissions to the bar. Under
this standard, a lawyer ―shall not . . . fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a
misapprehension known by the [lawyer] to have arisen in the matter.‖23 In its
general requirement, at least, this obligation is quite high, requiring lawyers not
merely to avoid causing others to err in apprehending the truth, but also to
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .‖).
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (ethical obligation ―to use
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client‘s cause‖). As observed supra note 3, the
conception of ―meritorious‖ in Rule 3.1 seems to rest more on whether a claim or defense is
winnable on the available admissible evidence than on whether the actual underlying facts
justify victory under substance of the law. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (2000) (defining a position as frivolous when there is ―no substantial
possibility that the tribunal would accept it‖). Indeed, the whole story of the ways lawyers use
the rules of evidence to keep out anything damaging and to get in anything that can sway the
factfinder‘s sympathies is a prime example of the ―duty to use legal procedure for the fullest
benefit of the client‘s cause . . . .‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009).
18. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009). As will be discussed infra text
accompanying notes 87–120, it would appear that the meaning of Rule 4.1(b) has been modified
considerably as a result of the 2003 amendment to MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)
(2009) (confidentiality).
19. See immediately following text and infra text accompanying notes 159–71.
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2009).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2009). Rule 1.6 generally prohibits
disclosure of any ―information relating to the representation of a client.‖ MODEL RULES OF
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009).
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correct them when the lawyer knows they have gotten it wrong, irrespective of
whether the lawyer (or client) did anything to bring about the error.24 The
obligation is, however, subordinate to the lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality,
which may appreciably undercut its impact.25 Notably, though, a similar and
apparently even higher standard of honesty applies to lawyer advertising
material, which the Model Rules consider ―false or misleading if it contains a
material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the
statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.‖26 This standard of
honesty seems even higher than the disciplinary/admissions standard because it
is not made subordinate to Rule 1.6 (confidentiality).27
Clearly the drafters of the Model Rules knew how to write rules that call
for truly honest behavior, as they showed when it came to questions of lawyer
advertising, bar admission, and discipline. However, they chose to write a
different standard of honesty and candor when it came to fashioning the rule on
―Truthfulness in Statements to Others.‖28 Apparently what is good for potential
clients and for the bar admission and disciplinary authorities is not so good, or
at least not deemed necessary, for the members of the public generally.
The multi-level duty of candor in the Model Rules, with at least four
different standards, has the effect, if not the purpose, of allowing lawyers in
most situations to take advantage of misapprehensions ―known . . . to have
arisen in the matter‖29 instead of trying to correct such misapprehensions. This
ability to take such advantage of others‘ mistakes is not, however, intrinsic to or
an inseparable part of an adversary system. While the adversarial process presupposes that each side will labor mightily to present evidence favorable to it
and to press for favorable inferences, an adversary system does not necessarily
require calculated nondisclosure of unfavorable evidence or the urging of
inferences known to be dubious or outright false.30 It is only in an exaggerated
24. Id.
25. Because the obligation is subordinate to Rule 1.6 (confidentiality), it may sometimes
result in a higher and sometimes a lower level of candor than that which applies before a
tribunal—depending on whether the information in question is protected by Rule 1.6.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the recent amendments to Rule 1.6 significantly contract the
reach of the duty of confidentiality, the scope of the lawyer‘s duty to warn under 8.1(b) is
presumably expanded. See infra text accompanying notes 87–120.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2009); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT R. 7.1. cmt. 2 (2009):
A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer's
communication considered as a whole not materially misleading. A truthful statement is
also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to
formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services for which there is
no reasonable factual foundation.
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2009).
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009).
29. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009).
30. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
543, 553–54 (1983) (arguing that the ―paramount goal‖ of civil adjudication is ―arriving at as
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or extreme version of the adversary system that efforts to game the process,
caginess about the evidence, the undermining of truthful testimony, and other
such tactics would be considered normal and legitimate parts of the lawyer‘s
task.
This is not to say that an exaggerated or extreme version of the adversary
system is not without its uses (albeit some of them questionable). For example,
an advocate who distracts from the truth or takes advantage of others‘ mistakes
can cause the law to misfire by making it apply to counterfactual versions of
events. By engaging in such strategies, lawyers can become powerful allies of
people who would prefer to escape the legally-prescribed consequences of their
acts or to obtain outcomes they are not entitled to under the substance of the
law. Since many people may prefer to avoid the legally-prescribed
consequences of their acts or to obtain legally unmerited benefits, one may
suppose that there is a substantial demand for lawyers who are willing to apply
their skills to make such outcomes possible. Moreover, the ability to hold
oneself out simply as a ―confidential advisor‖ gives lawyers a competitive
advantage in the marketplace for consulting, an advantage that is not shared by
others who provide similar services, such as accountants, management
consultants, investment advisors, tax preparers, domestic counselors, realtors,
and so on.31 As Professor Daniel Fischel has pointed out, the bulletproof
confidentiality supposedly required in our version of the adversary system gives
lawyers a legal monopoly on confidential advising and this, in turn, allows
lawyers to extract ―monopoly rents‖ (higher fees) from their clientele.32
However, a decidedly positive value of an exaggerated version of the adversary
system is that it can serve as a bulwark to protect individuals and private
interests against government. For a people who have been constitutionally

accurate a reconstruction of the past event as is possible‖ and advocating a set of rules, such as
those originally proposed by Marvin Frankel, requiring lawyers to reveal witnesses they do not
intend to offer, to report untrue statements and material omissions, and to question witnesses
―with [a] purpose and design to elicit the whole truth‖).
31. Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1998).
32. Id. (―unique advantage‖). In principle, the bulletproof confidentiality ―feature‖ of
lawyer‘s services would be available only to communications that are also covered by the
attorney-client privilege, a rule of evidence that is appreciably narrower in scope than the ethical
duty of confidentiality. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Ch. 5
introductory note (2000); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000). See generally CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 296 and 242–311 (1986). Only information covered by
the attorney-client privilege is immune to subpoena or other legal orders to divulge. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 64 (2000). However, even though a lawyer can be judicially compelled to reveal
information that is protected by the ethical duty of confidentiality (absent a privilege), the need
to obtain the required court orders and to show justification for them can operate as an
enormous practical barrier to disclosure, with a corresponding enhancement to the market value
of the lawyer‘s position as confidential advisor.
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suspicious of government since the earliest days of the Republic,33 having the
laws unfailingly applied according to their tenor is not necessarily a good thing.
It is something that may vary with the moral justness of the law.
Unfortunately, however, whatever may be the benefits of an extreme
version of the adversary system, they often come at the expense of truth. For
some, this is not necessarily a problem. It has been suggested, for example, that
―in actual practice the ascertainment of the truth is not necessarily the target of
the trial, [and] that values other than truth frequently take precedence.‖34 To be
sure, the legal system implements a variety of policies that can serve as
―barriers to information‖ and frustrate the search for truth.35 Nonetheless, the
decision to allow these barriers to exist is (or should be) a hard one. After all,
people can be subjected to economic ruination, sent to prison, and even put to
death36 based on the erroneous conceptions of ―truth‖ that emerge when
relevant evidence is systematically excluded from consideration—such as when
it is excluded based on an evidentiary ―privilege.‖ However, even if there are
some important policies that do justify barriers to information, it does not
follow that just any policy will justify such barriers. In particular, neither the
bar‘s interest in receiving ―monopoly rents‖ nor the wrongdoer‘s interest in
avoiding the law‘s consequences would seem to present a strong policy basis
for frustrating the search for truth. The interest of protecting individual and
private interests against government may offer a philosophically more
appealing justification for an exaggerated or extreme adversary system, since
such a system literally condones the passive obstruction, and indeed some
active obstruction, of government justice in the name of liberty and human
dignity.37 However, it is doubtful that a legal system could entertain a policy
that supports such ―obstruction‖ explicitly without either imposing very strict
limits, such as the bounds of our constitutional rights, or engaging in profound
self-contradiction.
There is no reason to believe that our own legal system contains any such
explicit self-contradiction. Nevertheless, the multi-level duty of candor in the
33. The Constitution, for example, contains numerous expressions of suspicion of
government and of the need for citizens to be protected from government, ranging from the
rights of the accused through the protections afforded to private property. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
AMENDS. IV–VI (granting rights regarding illegal search and seizure, private property, due
process, and self-incrimination, along with the right to counsel and a jury trial).
34. The Hon. Simon H. Rifkind, The Lawyer’s Role and Responsibility in Modern
Society, 30 REC. ASS‘N B. CITY N.Y. 534, 543 (1975).
35. Id. at 544–45. Rifkind lists, among other things, evidentiary privileges, constitutional
exclusionary rules, and standards of witness ―competence‖ to testify.
36. As the U.S. Supreme Court has pointed out, evidence of ―actual innocence‖ is not in
itself a basis to set aside a state death sentence once the judgment has become final. Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393, 400 (1993). The Court was concerned about ―the very disruptive
effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital
cases.‖ Id. at 417.
37. This is probably what Rifkind had in mind when he said that the adversary system is
―good for liberty.‖ Rifkind, supra note 34, at 537.
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Model Rules not only allows lawyers to take advantage of misapprehensions
known to have arisen on the part of others, but also to take active steps to
induce such misapprehensions—as long as the lawyer can do so without
resorting to outright lies or evidence tampering. One of the lawyer‘s most
valuable skills is the ability to weave stories that are false out of statements that
are true. To reiterate, however, a policy that allows such tactics is not a
necessary part of the adversary system. So why do the Model Rules leave so
much room to make this possible?
The Model Rules are not the ethical rules that one would expect to find in a
world of truly honest lawyers—not with their multi-level concept of candor and
their various provisions allowing lawyers to subordinate the revelation of truth
to the value of winning.38 In a world of truly honest lawyers, members of the
profession would never subordinate justice to victory by taking advantage of
others‘ errors or misunderstandings, let alone seek—by selective disclosures or
the like—to create such advantages. In other words, in such a world lawyers
could be trusted. While truly honest lawyers can no doubt survive and possibly
even thrive under a Model Rules regime,39 they would not likely be the norm,
nor would they be the sort of lawyers that are apparently presupposed by the
Model Rules themselves. And, they would certainly not be the lawyers you
would want if you deserve to suffer some legal sanction or if you desire to
obtain some benefit that you do not legally deserve.
There are, however, signs that an evolution is occurring in the legal
profession‘s view of honesty and the lawyer‘s role, as well as in the Model
Rules. After twice rejecting a crime/fraud exception to the lawyer‘s duty of
confidentiality, first in 1982 and then again in 2002,40 the American Bar
Association finally embraced a qualified crime/fraud exception in 2003.41
38. See infra text accompanying notes 121–81.
39. See generally John A. Humbach, The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An
Essay on Honesty, “Lawyer Honesty” and Public Trust in the Legal System, 20 PACE L. REV.
93 (1999) (discussing the competitive advantage that would be enjoyed by lawyers whom others
could trust without reservation). See also William H. Simon, Moral Freaks: Lawyers’ Ethics in
Academic Perspective (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 09-215), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496988 (arguing that it is a common
error to overstate the distance between ordinary law and legal ethics, especially as purposively
understood).
40. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 69–71 (2004) (describing the legislative history of Rule 1.6). Irma Russell describes
the 2002 rejection as ―a partial triumph of an absolutist view of confidentiality.‖ Irma Russell,
Client Confidences and Public Confidence in the Legal Profession: Observations on the ABA
House of Delegates Deliberations on the Duty of Confidentiality, 13 PROF. LAW. 19, 19 (Spring
2002) (describing the original rule as, essentially, reflecting an absolutist view of
confidentiality).
41. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 40, at 71. The ―qualification‖ of this qualified exception
is that the crime or fraud must be such that it is ―reasonably certain to result in [or has resulted
in] substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which
the client has used or is using the lawyer's services.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.
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Notably, amendments to Rule 1.6 (confidentiality) may breathe a new and
powerful life into Rule 4.1 (truthfulness to others), even though the language of
the latter remains unchanged.42 Perhaps the extreme adversarial vision of the
American legal system that was built into the Model Rules is being taken out
again. Perhaps, indeed, the Model Rules will soon evolve to the point where
truly honest legal practice, more concerned with truth than persuasion, with
legal justice than mere victory, will be not merely permitted but actually
fostered by the lawyers‘ code of ethics.
In the remainder of this article, the overall focus is on the duties that
lawyers have under the Model Rules to warn others laboring under
misapprehensions of material fact. We will begin with a look at the duty to
warn of client fraud or criminality under the original version of Rule 1.6
(confidentiality) as it was understood before and after the recent amendments—
particularly in light of ABA Formal Opinion 92-366 (on so-called ―noisy
withdrawal‖).43 This will be followed by consideration of a duty not to take
advantage of others‘ misapprehensions of material facts, setting certain
practices of lawyers against standards applied in the common law of larceny.44
Finally, we will look at the ethical aspects of using the legal process proactively
as part of an endeavor to induce a court to take property away from its owner
and give it to somebody else.45
I.

THE LAWYER‘S DUTY TO WARN OF CLIENT FRAUD OR
CRIMINALITY (―NOISY WITHDRAWAL‖)

Before the Model Rules were adopted, the ABA‘s model ethical standards
did not require lawyers to keep client information confidential if disclosure was
necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime.46 Instead, in the preModel Rules days a lawyer was ethically permitted (though not required) to
disclose a client‘s secrets in order to protect the potential victims of a client‘s
criminal fraud.47 However, in adopting the Model Rules in 1983, the ABA
1.6(b) (2009). For a further description of these changes, see Amanda Vance & Randi Wallach,
Updating Confidentiality: An Overview of the Recent Changes to Model Rule 1.6, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1003 (2004).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 87–120.
43. Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 366 (1992)
(hereinafter Formal Opinion 92-366).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 121–211.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 212–73.
46. ABA CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS Canon 37 (1937), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 323–24
(1997) (―The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the
confidences which he is bound to respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be
necessary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened.‖); MODEL CODE OF
PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4–101(C)(3) (1979) (―A lawyer may reveal . . . [t]he intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.‖).
47. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4–101(C)(3) (1979).
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decided to break with this tradition. The House of Delegates voted to reject
proposals that would have retained lawyers‘ broad ethical liberty to disclose
client information in order to prevent their client‘s crimes.48 Instead, the ABA
adopted a very narrow ―crime‖ exception to the duty of confidentiality,
applying only in cases where the client‘s criminal activities were ―likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm.‖49 There was no exception
at all for cases of client frauds or crimes that would merely cause serious
financial losses or damage to property interests. The lawyer‘s ethical duty of
confidentiality had reached a new modern high.
Nevertheless, ten years later, in 1992, the ABA's Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility recognized in Formal Opinion 92-366
that lawyers sometimes are not merely permitted but ethically required to make
certain disclosures of confidential client information in order to avoid
―assisting‖ in a client‘s prospective crime or fraud.50 This obligation was
discovered to be rooted in existing Model Rule 1.2(d), which declares: ―A
lawyer shall not . . . assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent . . . .‖51 The formal opinion reasoned that sometimes the lawyer
may be unable to meet this ethical prohibition against ―assisting‖ a client‘s
crime or fraud by merely withdrawing from representation.52 A typical situation
where this inability might occur is when the client is planning to use documents
previously drafted by the lawyer in order to carry out a post-withdrawal fraud or
48. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 32
(6th ed. 2002) (hereinafter GILLERS). Under the January 1980 draft of the pertinent provision, ―a
lawyer may disclose information about a client . . . to the extent it appears necessary to prevent
or rectify the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act by the client.” Id. Under the
subsequent May 1981 draft, the scope of the permission to disclose would have been
substantially narrower than under the 1980 draft, though still unacceptably generous from the
standpoint of the ABA:
[A] lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer believes
necessary . . . to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in . . . substantial injury to the financial interest or
property of another [or] or rectify the consequences of a criminal or fraudulent act in the
commission of which the lawyer‘s services had been used.
Id. (first alteration in orginal). It too was rejected.
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (1997) (former version, now
superseded), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 27 (1997). An excellent analysis of the original and
revised versions of the ―bodily harm‖ exception is found in Russell, supra note 40, at 19–21
(describing the original rule as, essentially, reflecting an ―absolutist view of confidentiality‖).
50. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43.
51. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009).
52. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.
1.16(a)(1) (2009) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation if ―the representation will
result in a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.‖ An example would be if
the representation would assist the client in committing a crime or fraud in violation of Rule
1.2).
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crime.53 In situations such as this, the only way the lawyer can avoid assisting
the client‘s wrong may be a so-called ―noisy withdrawal,‖ that is, a withdrawal
accompanied by notice to the affected parties and, even, an express disavowal
of prior work product.54 The Committee‘s majority located this requirement of
noisy withdrawal not in any one rule but in the interplay between several
different rules, specifically those relating to confidentiality,55 withdrawal,56and
the scope of representation.57 In short, the disclosure requirement of Formal
Opinion 92-366 emerges when, due to the continuing effects of the lawyer‘s
prior representation, disclosure is the only way for the lawyer to avoid
―assisting‖ the client‘s crime or fraud.
The formal opinion was based on certain assumed facts, which in highly
simplified form are: A lawyer has represented Client, a small corporation, for
several years.58 About a year ago, Client obtained a $5 million bank loan, and
in that connection, the lawyer provided the customary opinion letter.59 The
letter stated that all of Client‘s outstanding sales contracts were enforceable
obligations against Client‘s customers.60 Now two senior officers of Client have
just told the lawyer that for the past several years they have been creating phony
purchase orders.61 These phony orders make Client‘s sales figures look much
greater than they actually are and, also, make the lawyer‘s opinion letter
inaccurate.62 Nevertheless, Client intends to continue using the letter
fraudulently in its ongoing dealings with the bank, including an existing line of
credit, and possibly in a future major loan as well.63
In a world of truly honest lawyers this kind of situation would not present
any quandary at all, much less one that calls for a request for expert ethics
advice with a sharply divided opinion as the result.64 Not only has an innocent
person fallen into a trap that the lawyer helped to set (albeit unconsciously), but
the client‘s intention to continue making use of the lawyer‘s letter means that
the trap is an ongoing menace into the future. Whatever the lawyer‘s absence of
fault in the first instance, it simply would not be truly honest to leave victims in
the traps that one has created, let alone leave the traps lying around to be
blundered into again. The client has not merely told a serious lie and obtained
millions of dollars by doing it, but the lawyer‘s past services are helping the
53. See Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43.
54. Id.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2009). See supra note 52 for excerpt.
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009).
58. Formal Opinion 92–366, supra note 43.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. The formal opinion was accompanied by a strong dissent, discussed infra text
accompanying notes 80–84.
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client advance similar ―interests‖ in the future. If the client cannot be persuaded
to reveal the lie, then the truly honest lawyer would have to do so.
The formal opinion did not, however, go quite this far. It concluded that,
based on the Model Rules, the lawyer would have to make a disclosure in a
situation like this, but the rules would not require or even permit the lawyer to
explain the truth.65 They would not allow the lawyer to set things straight or to
provide whatever facts might be reasonably required to correct the client‘s
crime or fraud or to prevent it in the future.66 On the contrary, the
―disaffirmance should . . . go no further than necessary to accomplish its
purpose of avoiding the lawyer‘s assisting the client‘s fraud.‖67 If the client can
carry out its criminal or fraudulent scheme without making further use of the
lawyer‘s assistance or past work, then so be it. The point of a noisy withdrawal
is, it seems, not so much to protect the public as to keep the lawyer clean, under
Rule 1.2(d). It does not prevent the clients from committing fraud but merely
prevents them from conscripting their lawyers into ―a de facto continuation of
the representation even if the lawyer has ceased to perform any additional
work.‖68
The reasoning of the formal opinion began with an admission that the
Model Rules nowhere explicitly authorize the disclosure that the opinion
decides is required.69 The opinion noted, however, that a comment to Rule 1.6
(confidentiality) clearly presupposed that the rule would allow noisy
withdrawals.70 According to the comment in question, Rule 1.6 does not
prevent a lawyer from ―giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer
may also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the
like.‖71 The formal opinion treated this comment‘s apparent exception to
confidentiality as a correct interpretation of Rule 1.6 even though, only six
months before adopting the comment, the ABA had refused to adopt a draft of
Rule 1.6 that would have permitted such disclosures explicitly.72 The rejected
draft, which would have continued the general spirit of the traditional rule,
permitted disclosure in cases of client fraud or crime as an explicit exception to

65. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. (―[T]he text of [Rule 1.6 (confidentiality)] itself contains no exception that would
permit her to reveal the fraud to the bank, . . . to the new law firm the company has retained, or
to anyone else. Nor is disclosure explicitly authorized by any other ethical rule.‖).
70. Id. In a subsequent amendment in 2003, the ABA has since deleted the supporting
language in question from the comment, apparently because a similar passage had previously
been added in 2002 to the comments to Rule 1.2 and Rule 4.1. See infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2003), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 40
(2003).
72. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43.
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the duty of confidentiality.73 However, in an effort to square the comment‘s
language with the rejection of the draft 1.6, the formal opinion pointed out that
the comment‘s interpretation of Rule 1.6 (to allow noisy withdrawal) was ―substantially narrower‖ than the much broader permissions to disclose that the
rejected draft would have conferred.74 Indeed, the formal opinion questioned
whether allowing noisy withdrawal really constituted an ―exception‖ to
confidentiality at all.75 It was, rather, simply ―the inevitable consequence[] of
one rule‘s operation upon another‖ and ―a recognition that fulfillment of the
lawyer‘s obligations under Rules 1.16(a)(1) and 1.2(d) may have the collateral
effect of inferentially revealing a confidence.‖76
Notably, the crucial language of the comment on which the formal opinion
relied was77 permissive rather than mandatory.78 Nowhere did the comment
state that lawyers might ever have an ethical ―duty‖ to disclose client
information in order to avoid assisting in clients‘ crime or fraud. However, in
the course of the formal opinion‘s line of reasoning, the comment‘s permission
to disclose got transmuted into a duty to disclose when the circumstances make
disclosure the only way the lawyer can avoid having his or her work product
used to assist a crime or fraud.79
It probably would go too far to say that Formal Opinion 92-366 settled the
issue of noisy withdrawal. For one thing there was a strong dissent, which
rejected the notion that the lawyer‘s past work product is the equivalent of
current and continuing ―representation.‖80 By rejecting this notion, the dissent
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added). Rule 1.16(a)(1) states that ―[A] lawyer . . . shall withdraw from
the representation of a client if . . . the representation will result in [sic] violation of the rules of
professional conduct or other law . . . .‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(a)(1) (2009).
Rule 1.2(d) states that ―[a] lawyer shall not . . . assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows
is criminal or fraudulent . . . .‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2009).
77. The past tense is used here because the comment in question has since been amended.
See supra note 70.
78. Formal Op. 92-366, supra note 43. (―Neither this Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule
1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may
also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like.‖).
79. Id. In line with the opinion‘s reasoning, before there can be a permission to disclose
under the comment to Rule 1.6, there would have to be an obligation to disclose under Model
Rules 1.16(a)(1) and 1.2(d). Id. Accordingly, there can be a permission to disclose only where
there is a duty to disclose. Id.
80. Id. (dissent). The dissenters did not agree that a client‘s post-withdrawal use of a
lawyer‘s work product constitutes continuing representation. Id. Because the dissent rejected the
notion that ―past completed representation‖ could be ―miraculously resurrected and revivified
into a current representation,‖ the dissent did not see the use by the client of an ―old opinion
letter‖ as representation—ergo, there could not be the predicate ―representation‖ requiring
further withdrawal, ―noisy‖ or otherwise. Id. ―Model Rule 1.16(a)(1), thus, clearly contemplates
mandatory withdrawal only if future ongoing representational services will be improperly used
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was able to conclude that disaffirmances of work-product should neither be
required nor permitted.81 Another reason the formal opinion does not settle the
issue of noisy withdrawal is that it was, in the final analysis, only the view of a
committee within a private organization, and it may well be at odds with the
strong stance towards confidentiality that most lawyers hold. Among
practitioners, the core value that lawyers do not squeal on clients runs deep, and
different lawyers may reach their own, alternative syntheses of the various
applicable rules. A technical objection to the majority‘s conclusion is that it is
very hard to reconcile with the comments to Rule 4.1, which specifically deals
with the problem of disclosures to avoid ―assisting.‖82 The comments to that
rule, both at the time of the formal opinion and now, expressly subordinate the
lawyer‘s duty to disclose to the duty of confidentiality.83 Finally, there is the
awkward point that crucial comment language on which the majority relied has
been removed from Rule 1.6 and relocated to comments on other rules84 where
it may no longer be so easy to treat as an ―interpretation‖ of Rule 1.6.
The most problematic feature of the formal opinion is, however, its
essentially binary character. The lawyer under the assumed facts had already
concluded that she could no longer continue representing this client and that
she was required to withdraw under Model Rule 1.16(a).85 The only question
by the client. Only then would a ‗noisy withdrawal‘ be permissible.‖ Id.
81. Id.
82. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) cmts. 2–3 (2009); see also supra note
9 for relevant text of rule.
83. Former comment 3 to Model Rule 4.1 read: ―The requirement of disclosure created by
this paragraph is, however, subject to the obligations created by Rule 1.6.‖ MODEL RULES OF
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 3 (1992) (amended 2003). The current version of the comment is
similar. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 3 (2009).
84. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10, 4.1 cmt. 3 (2009); see also supra
note 70. In the comments to Rule 1.2, the language reads: ―It may be necessary [to avoid
‗assisting‘] for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion,
document, affirmation, or the like.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10 (2009).
While this addition to the comments to Rule 1.2 is arguably even more empowering than the
language that was removed from Rule 1.6, the relocation of the thought from 1.6 to 1.2 makes it
far less obvious that the language should be treated as an interpretation of Rule 1.6. For one
thing, it would be odd to find such a significant interpretive qualification of Rule 1.6 set out in
the comments to an altogether different rule. Moreover, in the new comment to Rule 1.2, the
language in question is immediately followed by the reference ―See Rule 4.1.‖ Id. Since the duty
to volunteer information under Rule 4.1 is made expressly subject to the duty of confidentiality
of Rule 1.6, so too, arguably, are the duties to ―give notice‖ and ―disaffirm‖ under Rule 1.2. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10, 4.1 cmt. 3 (2009). At least, the comment that
expressly mentions those duties seems, with its reference to 4.1, to imply as much. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10 (2009). In other words, the net result may be that, in
those circumstances where Rule 1.6 requires confidentiality, noisy withdrawal may arguably no
longer be permitted and the duty not to assist by silence is now qualified by the duty of
confidentiality (albeit a more limited duty under the recent amendments to Rule 1.6). See infra
text accompanying notes 87–120.
85. Formal Opinion 92-366, supra note 43.
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left for her was what, if anything, she was permitted or required to say about
her former client in the course of withdrawing. It is far more likely that a lawyer
will encounter the problem of client misconduct in circumstances that are rather
less dramatic than a $5 million fraud committed in a single, relatively large
transaction. What, for example, of all the little ―crimes or frauds‖ that a
corporate client‘s personnel might commit in the course of cutting corners on
the innumerable rules and regulations—from employee safety and protecting
the environment to financial and securities reporting, maintaining needed
permits, and all the rest—that are a part of doing business in a modern
regulatory state? The trouble with Formal Opinion 92-366 is that it seems to
presuppose that the lawyer either succeeds in getting the client to get into full
legal compliance or the lawyer must get out—mandating withdrawal at least
with respect to any legal services in which the lawyer might be deemed to
―assist.‖86 However, real life is not quite so binary; it is not so clear-cut in the
choices it presents. For clients doing business in a modern regulatory state, the
ways of breaking the law are so numerous, and competitive pressures to shade
the truth so intense, that it may be relatively unusual for lawyers to withdraw
their assistance every time they know (or ought to know) that their clients‘
ongoing operations are not in full and punctilious compliance with all the many
laws.
Whatever its weaknesses and uncertainties, however, Formal Opinion 92366 is clear authority for the proposition that the Model Rules as originally
promulgated by the ABA did impose a duty to warn, after a fashion, of a
client‘s impending crime or fraud. The warning was not permitted to be
specific, nor could it presumably even be phrased as a warning per se.
Nevertheless, the Model Rules did impose a duty to speak, as a last resort,
when a lawyer‘s pre-existing work product was going to be used by a former
client in a future crime or fraud.
II. THE LAWYER‘S DUTY TO WARN UNDER MODEL RULE 4.1 AFTER
THE RECENT AMENDMENTS
Prior to 2003, there were two very narrow classes of explicit exceptions to
the duty of confidentiality in Model Rule 1.6, namely (1) to prevent death or
substantial bodily harm,87 and (2) to protect the lawyer.88 The Model Rules did
86. Id. The formal opinion did allege the possibility that a lawyer could withdraw as to the
―matters relating to the fraud‖ (or crime?) without severing the entire relationship. Id. However,
that particular gambit may seem fairly unrealistic for many who are in-house counsel and
probably would not work very well for outside counsel either.
87. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 40, at 69–71 (history of Rule 1.6); see also Russell,
supra note 40, at 19 (discussing remedial changes to Rule 1.6). The ―death or bodily harm‖
exception was expanded in 2002 from an ultra-narrow exception (for cases of ―imminent‖ death
or substantial bodily harm threatened by a client‘s crime) to a considerably broader one (for
cases of ―reasonably certain‖ death or substantial bodily harm, from whatever cause‖). GILLERS
& SIMON, supra note 40, at 69–71.
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not, however, explicitly obligate or even permit a lawyer to disclose client
confidences in order to prevent fraud or otherwise to protect the financial or
property interests of others. As previously mentioned, this sweeping breadth of
the Model Rules‘ confidentiality duty was in sharp contrast with the ABA‘s
earlier Model Code and Canons of Professional Ethics.89 However, in 2003
there was a return to something approximating the traditional contours of the
confidentiality duty when the ABA approved extensive amendments to Model
Rule 1.6. Under these 2003 amendments:
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
...
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using
the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has
resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of
which the client has used the lawyer's services . . . .90

In other words, with certain qualifications, the newly modified Rule 1.6
now explicitly permits lawyers to reveal confidential client information in order
to prevent, mitigate, or rectify financial or property injuries due to the client‘s
crime or fraud.91 The main pre-requisites for the exception are, first, that the
injury in question must be ―substantial‖ and second, that the client must have
used the lawyer‘s services ―in furtherance of‖ the crime or fraud.92
By using the word ―may‖ in the introductory clause, this new amendment
to Rule 1.6 appears to permit but not require lawyers to disclose client
information for the protection of others.93 However, when the newly amended
version of Rule 1.6 is read in combination with the already existing language of
Rule 4.1(b), the Model Rules now indeed appear to charge lawyers with an
ethical obligation to disclose. Specifically, under the relevant language of Rule
4.1, ―[i]n the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . .
(b) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid
88. Sometimes referred to as the ―self-defense‖ exceptions, these allow the lawyer to
breach confidentiality to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to collect the fee or
otherwise to mount an effective case in litigation with a former client. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) & cmts. 10–11 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 64 (2000); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §6.7.8
(1986).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2009).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
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assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6.‖94 Although the language of Rule 4.1 has not changed, the newest
amendments to Rule 1.6 have radically altered the practical meaning of its final
clause, viz. ―unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.‖95
Under the pre-2003 version of Rule 1.6, the main thrust of Rule 4.1(b) was
essentially swallowed up by its final clause. While the subsection‘s first twentyone words seemed to mandate a fairly wide range of disclosures of material
facts, the final clause cut down the duty to disclose to the point where it was, as
a practical matter, miniscule. Nearly all useful information that a lawyer is
likely to possess would normally be ―information relating to the representation‖
of a client and, therefore, locked up under Rule 1.6.96 To the extent that such
information could not be revealed under Rule 1.6, it could not be revealed
under the final clause of 4.1(b) either.97 And because the former version of
Rule 1.6 had no crime or fraud exception, the reference to Rule 1.6 utterly
cramped the apparent sweep of Rule 4.1(b), permitting the disclosure of
practically nothing.98
Under the new version of Rule 1.6, however, the reach of Rule 4.1(b) has
now been dramatically expanded. Rather than forbidding lawyers to divulge
client information concerning client crimes or fraud, the new Rule 1.6 now
broadly permits such disclosures.99 Since Rule 4.1(b) requires its disclosures
when Rule 1.6 permits them, a new and wide-ranging ―duty to warn‖ has
emerged.100 Whenever a lawyer believes that a Rule 4.1 disclosure is reasonably
necessary to ―prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another, and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using
the lawyer's services,‖ then disclosure by the lawyer seems not merely
permitted by Rule 1.6 but required under a joint reading of Rules 1.6 and
4.1.101 That is, at least, what the words say.
Although some commentators agree with this reading,102 including
inferentially an opinion of the Massachusetts Committee on Professional
94. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009) (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009).
98. The main exception would seem to be for situations where a failure to disclose would
actually be illegal. For example, under current Rule 1.2(d), which was added in 2002, the failure
to disclose would cause the lawyer to personally commit a fraud. See United States v. Cavin, 39
F.3d 1299, 1308–09 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing a number of circumstances to be considered in
deciding whether a lawyer‘s failure to divulge potential damaging facts would constitute fraud
by the lawyer).
99. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2009).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 4.1(b) (2009).
101. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 4.1 (2009).
102. Thomas D. Morgan, Sarbanes-Oxley: A Complication, Not a Contribution, in the
Effort to Improve Corporate Lawyers' Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 7
(2003) (―Corporate lawyers thus are now required by Model Rule 4.1 to disclose outside the
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Ethics,103 there is at least one important commentator who does not. The one
who does not is, moreover, the Reporter for the Task Force of Corporate
Responsibility, the committee that recommended (or, more precisely, rerecommended) the 2003 amendments to the ABA‘s House of Delegates. 104
According to Reporter (and Professor) Lawrence Hamermesh, the Task Force
certainly had ―no intention or expectation that it was recommending a
mandatory disclosure obligation.‖105 Indeed, the Final Report of the Task Force
says exactly that.106 Nonetheless, one is tempted here to advert to Justice
Holmes‘s famous dictum on using legislative history in statutory interpretation:
―I don't care what their intention was. I only want to know what the words
mean.‖107 And the words—that is to say the words that were presented to and
adopted by vote of the ABA House of Delegates—are diametrically opposed to
the idea that the lawyer‘s disclosure obligations under Rule 4.1(b) are merely
permissive. By modifying Rule 1.6, the ABA has taken the lid off the pot in
Rule 4.1(b).108
The Task Force was, of course, literally correct in saying that it did not
recommend creating any new mandatory disclosure obligation, for the
obligation in question was already in the existing language of Rule 4.1(b).109
The new amendments to Rule 1.6 are, in themselves, merely permissive. What
is more, the range of situations in which Rule 1.6 permits disclosure appears to
be significantly broader than the range in which Rule 4.1(b) would require
corporation any ‗material fact . . . necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a
client.‘ It would be hard to make the point much more clearly.‖) (alteration in original). Cf.
Jolyn M. Pope, Transactional Attorneys—The Forgotten Actors in Rule 1.6 Disclosure Dramas:
Financial Crime and Fraud Mandate Permissive Disclosure of Confidential Information, 69
TENN. L. REV. 145, 169–70 (2001) (recognizing the interpretation, but recommending deletion
of Model Rule 4.1(b) to eliminate required disclosure).
103. See Mass. Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Op. 2 (1999) (interpreting the similar
confidentiality exception in the requirements of Rule 8.3 (Reporting Professional Misconduct)).
104. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility and the
2003 Changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 35, 35
(2003).
105. Id. at 54 n.92.
106. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 53 n.94 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporate
responsibility/final_report.pdf.
107. Letter from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, quoted in Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947).
108. I do not mean here to be facile about taking parties‘ intent seriously and carrying their
intentions into force to the greatest extent possible. See infra text accompanying notes 252–73.
However, it seems to me that, in the present context, the intentions that count are those of the
―legislators‖ who had the legal power to vote on and adopt the measure, not the intent of the
―legislative staff‖ personnel who originally wrote it. If the intention of those voting cannot be
known, then their intention should be taken to be that which can reasonably be imputed to them
based on the wording that they approved.
109. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009).

2009]

SHIFTING PARADIGMS

1011

disclosures.110 To the extent that their ranges differ, it can quite properly be said
that the 2003 amendments enacted a new zone of permission to disclose within
which there is no corresponding duty to disclose.111 For instance, the chief
relevant qualifier of Rule 4.1(b) is ―necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client,‖112 whereas the relevant qualifier of Rule 1.6(b)(2)–
(3) is ―in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's
services.‖113 These qualifiers are not necessarily synonymous.114 Another
example of the difference in range emerges from the permission in the new
Rule 1.6 to disclose client information to ―prevent, mitigate or rectify‖ client
crime or fraud, or its consequences.115 By contrast, Rule 4.1 mandates
disclosure only to ―avoid assisting‖ a client‘s crime or fraud. It is debatable
whether ―assisting‖ always necessarily includes any failure to ―prevent,
mitigate or rectify.‖116
Another way in which the ranges differ is due to the gap that exists
between the set consisting of ―criminal or fraudulent‖ acts under Rule 4.1,117
and the somewhat smaller set consisting of ―crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another‖ found in Rule 1.6.118 Even after the 2003 amendments, Rule 1.6 still
prohibits—as much as it ever did—disclosures of client information with
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 4.1(b) (2009).
111. This distinction is noted by Ms. Pope, who sees the remedy as deletion of Rule 4.1(b).
Pope, supra note 102, at 170 n.141.
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009) (emphasis added).
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (2009).
114. For example, a lawyer who obtains the release of a professional pickpocket on bail
could not, I think, be considered to have ―assisted‖ in the client‘s subsequent pocket picking
without a radical re-thinking of the defense lawyer‘s duties in arraignments. Nonetheless, the
services provided by the lawyer at the bail hearing might be seen as being ―in furtherance‖ of
the pickpocket‘s trade. Cf. United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 631 (7th Cir. 1998)
(sentencing lawyer to eighty-seven months after engaging in ―traditional litigation-related
conduct‖ in an endeavor, later deemed ―corrupt,‖ to prevent a successful prosecution of his
client on gambling charges).
115. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2009); see also Formal Opinion 92366, supra note 43, which appeared to take the view that a lawyer would not be ―assisting‖ (and
therefore not required to do a ―noisy withdrawal‖) unless the client was intending to continue
putting the lawyer‘s innocently provided legal services to nefarious use. In interpreting the
analogous use of the word ―assist‖ in 1.2(d), the formal opinion stated:
Similarly, under the injunction in Rule 1.2(d) that a lawyer shall not ―assist a client in
conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,‖ the term ―assist‖ must be reasonably
construed to cover a failure to repudiate or otherwise disassociate herself from prior work
product the lawyer knows or has reason to believe is furthering the client's continuing or
future criminal or fraudulent conduct.
Id. (emphasis added).
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2009).
118. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
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respect to small-impact frauds or crimes, viz. those that produce only minor
injuries or none at all.119 Thus, it seems a fair hypothesis that, for a substantial
proportion of actual situations, the 2003 amendments to Rule 1.6 have no
application at all, and the pre-2003 rules (including Formal Opinion 92-366)
are still in full force, calling for mandatory noisy withdrawal (but only limited
disclosures) for smaller injuries and required disclosures to avoid assisting for
substantial-injury situations.
Nevertheless, for those cases in which a client‘s crime or fraud has resulted
in or is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests
or property of another, the 2003 amendments to the Model Rules have made an
important advance in the direction of truly honest lawyering. Even if one
accepts the view of the Task Force, a lawyer now has, at the very least,
permission to reveal information to the extent reasonably believed necessary to
―prevent, mitigate or rectify‖ a client‘s fraud or crime that the lawyer‘s services
have been used to further.120 And accepting the clear import of the language
itself, a lawyer now has a duty to reveal.
III. WHAT MAKES ―HONESTY‖ SO COMPLICATED?
We have already seen that what counts as being honest has varied over time
under the Canons, the Model Code, and now the Model Rules and their recent
amendments. And this is not to mention the variations in the ethical content of
lawyer honesty that exist from state to state.121 Then there are the arcane
analytical contortions employed in Formal Opinion 92-366, which addressed
what might seem to be a fairly basic ethical point in a ―cramped and legalistic
way‖ rather than resort to high principles.122 Law students sometimes wonder,
when trying to absorb and remember materials such as these, why is honesty so
complicated? What can explain all these convolutions and twists? They, who
have not quite yet adopted the mindset of a lawyer, are surprised by all this
intricacy: Why do lawyers have such a hard time parsing out what it means to
be honest?
One of the complicating factors, if not the chief among them, is the vision
that lawyers have of their own role under our prevailing version of the
adversary system.123 As that role is explained in the Model Rules and
comments, ―a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. For example, New Jersey requires disclosures to protect the financial interests of
others, and fifteen other states permit such disclosures. GILLERS & SIMON supra note 40, at 73–
75.
122. GILLERS, supra note 48, at 620.
123. ―One of the basic tenets of our adversarial legal system is that the lawyer owes the
client loyalty and zealous representation. That duty includes . . . confidentiality: as a general
rule, the lawyer may not divulge client confidences except in very limited instances.‖ United
States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1308 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
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objectives of representation,‖124 and then ―take whatever lawful and ethical
measures are required to vindicate a client‘s cause or endeavor‖125 by using
―legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client‘s cause‖ within the limits of
―[t]he law, both procedural and substantive.‖126
Obviously, this vision of the lawyer‘s central role leaves little room for
reaching out to help the other side when it is about to make a blunder. On the
contrary, it is a professional truism of current American legal practice that a
lawyer has no general duty to volunteer.127 In our version of the adversary
system, there is no general obligation to disabuse an opposing attorney even
when the lawyer knows the other attorney is making an obvious mistake or
laboring under serious misapprehensions of fact or law.128 In litigation, this lack
of obligation means a lawyer does not have to call the opponent‘s attention to
an error even when the lawyer can be virtually certain that the error will make
the process go wrong, producing an outcome that the law was not substantively
supposed to produce,129 in other words, a ―miscarriage‖ of justice. In
transactions, it means that a lawyer need not inform the opposite party of key
124. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009).
125. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2009).
126. Id.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2009) (―A lawyer . . . generally has
no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts.‖); ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 387 (1994) (stating that there is no general duty to inform an
opposing party and court that statute of limitations has run); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 375 (1993) (stating that a lawyer has no general obligation to
disclose information adverse to the client in the context of a bank examination); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. e (2000) (stating that there
is ―no legal duty to make an affirmative disclosure of fact or law when dealing with a
nonclient‖); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. f &
Reporter‘s Notes cmt. f (2000) (recognizing greater duties to volunteer information in the case
of lawyers representing government). But cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 387 (1994) (finding no basis in the rules for holding a lawyer representing a
government agency to a different standard).
128. The litigating lawyer must, of course, disclose ―directly adverse‖ legal authority to the
tribunal. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111(2) (2000). But this requirement is of scant help to an
adversary or negotiating counterpart when the parties are not currently litigating. What is more,
depending on the circumstances of the disclosure, its timing, and so on, the disclosure
requirement may be of little aid to the unaware opponent in a lawsuit.
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. b (2000).
A lawyer might know of testimony or other evidence vital to the other party, but unknown
to that party or their [sic] advocate. The advocate who knows of the evidence, and who has
complied with applicable rules concerning pretrial discovery and other applicable
disclosure requirements . . . , has no legal obligation to reveal the evidence, even though
the proceeding thereby may fail to ascertain the facts as the lawyer knows them.
Id. A comment to Rule 3.3 states that ―[t]here are circumstances where a failure to make a
disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation,‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2009), but nowhere is there a suggested general duty to volunteer.
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circumstances which, if it were aware of them, would almost certainly change
its mind about the terms of the deal, or doing the deal at all.130 Indeed, most
lawyers would probably understand it as their duty, both in litigation and
transactions, to regard the mistakes and misapprehensions of the opposing side
as opportunities, deliberately taking advantage of them whenever possible. This
overall idea may even be thought of (erroneously, I think) as a core premise of
the adversary system.
In an adversary system, each party is responsible for presenting, as
forcefully and persuasively as it can, the facts and the law in the light most
favorable to its own interest. This responsibility need not necessarily include a
right (much less a duty) to take advantage of other lawyers‘ mistakes. In an
exaggerated version of the adversary system, however, deliberately taking
advantage of others‘ mistakes or misapprehensions is not only condoned but
may even be considered admirable—a deft way to snatch victory from the jaws
of defeat or to protect the interests of a client whose cause is a loser on both the
law and the actual facts.
Consider, for example, the case of Cotto v. United States.131 A child‘s hand
was severely injured when it got caught in a conveyer belt operated by an
employee of the United States Department of Agriculture.132 A claim for
compensation was filed against the government on the boy‘s behalf.133 The
government‘s lawyers adopted a typical stance of tort defense counsel and
resisted paying the claim.134 When the boy‘s lawyer resiliently failed to supply
certain documentation demanded by the government, the case was dismissed
with prejudice for failure to prosecute.135 In seeking to reopen the judgment
sixteen months later, plaintiffs contended that their earlier failure to make a
timely motion or appeal should be excused because the government had
continued to negotiate a settlement even after the judgment was entered.136
However, the court rejected this contention saying (among other things) that
even if the government had continued to negotiate, there was no evidence
―indicating a pattern of affirmative action on the government's part which
would have led a reasonably prudent person to believe that the dismissal order
130. See id.
131. 993 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1993).
132. Id. at 276.
133. Id.
134. See id. There was some significant sentiment on the government side that the boy's
claim should be compensated, but the posture taken by the lawyers was forthrightly defensive.
See id. at 276, 281.
135. Id. at 277. It was apparently decided below, and accepted on appeal, that the missing
documentation was necessary for ―a substantiated, completed administrative claim‖ and,
therefore, plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedy as required before bringing
suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 276–77. The court mentions photographs that the
boy‘s lawyer ―would supply‖ to the Department of Agriculture and adds that he ―apparently
believ[ed] that the photographs would satisfy DOA's curiosity anent the extent of injury. He was
wrong.‖ Id. at 276.
136. Id. at 277.

2009]

SHIFTING PARADIGMS

1015

was something other than [final].‖137 The court ridiculed the notion that the
government ―acted in a Svengali-like manner, lulling them to sleep with
settlement songs while the sands of time drained and the appeal period
expired.‖138 All the government had done was stand by and allow the plaintiff‘s
lawyer to blunder along until any possibility of justice on the merits was lost.
The point about Cotto is not the magnitude of the lawyer‘s strategic
mistakes,139 but what the opposing lawyers and the court did about them, and
what those responses tell us about the lawyer‘s role in our exaggerated version
of the adversary system. The first thing we see is that the people who work in
the justice system are not responsible for dispensing substantive ―justice‖ the
way that, for example, physicians dispense healing. Nobody in the Cotto
process was personally responsible for seeing that both the boy and the
government got what they substantively deserved, only that the applicable
process rules were followed. Second, there is nothing wrong with seizing upon
a ―windfall defense‖140 that emerges due to the opposition‘s errors or
ineptitude. Finally, in an exaggerated version of the adversary system, no one
would think that the government‘s lawyers should feel any shame or receive the
contempt of their peers for taking advantage of an opponent‘s mistakes to
deprive the mangled child of his day in court (and, most likely, substantial
compensation). On the contrary, they won a substantively ―difficult‖ case,
ordinarily a matter for professional pride. In our exaggerated version of the
adversary system, the mistakes and misapprehensions of the opponent are seen
not as dangers to justice but as legitimate opportunities to further the interests
of one‘s own client—even including the interest in not paying damages that are
substantively due. For a lawyer to disabuse the other side of the errors it is
making would itself be regarded as a blunder,141 even though taking advantage
of these errors might produce a legal result that is unwarranted by the actual
facts and substance of the law.142
137. Id. at 279 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 278.
139. Mistakes, at least, in the view of the court. See id. at 281.
140. The term is adopted from State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Prof‘l and Jud. Ethics, Formal
Op. CI–1164 (1987), available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered_opinions/
ci-1164.html (defense counsel may present truthful but misleading evidence that exploits the
complaining witness‘s confusion as to the time when the criminal act took place) [hereinafter
Mich. Formal Opinion CI-1164].
141. It could also, quite possibly, be a breach of the disciplinary rules. See United States v.
Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1309 (5th Cir. 1994); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 387 (1994); Mich. Formal Opinion CI-1164, supra note 140.
142. Of course, the ―substance of the law‖ may always be debatable, and honest lawyers
should always be free to advocate for whatever substantive legal rules and policies are in their
clients‘ best interests. That is to say, it is not dishonest for a lawyer to argue that the law on a
given point is different from what the lawyer might personally think it is or, as an abstract
matter, should be, as long as no dishonest use is made of the legal authorities and the arguments
are not frivolous. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3(2) (2009). However,
controversies about facts, including intentions of the parties, are of a different order. Unlike the
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In short, in an exaggerated adversary system, the lawyer‘s job is to press
client-defined interests by any means available within the bounds of the law
and ethical rules.143 In such a system, the absence of a duty to volunteer may
seem almost inseparable from the lawyer‘s core responsibility to present his or
her own side as persuasively as possible. And this can make true ―honesty‖
very complicated.
There is, however, no intrinsic reason why an adversary system must allow
lawyers to treat others‘ mistakes as strategic opportunities. Indeed, even while
American lawyers do not currently have a general duty to volunteer relevant
information to adversaries,144 a number of cases have found such a duty in
particular situations. The legal-ethics chestnut Spaulding v. Zimmerman145 is
not, strictly speaking, one of these cases, but it is nonetheless a good place to
begin. During settlement negotiations in an automobile negligence case, the
defense lawyers omitted to tell the injured plaintiff that he had an aortic
aneurysm—a sort of physiological time bomb.146 For some reason, the boy‘s
own doctors had failed to notice this life-threatening condition.147 According to
the court, defense counsel kept the discovery of the aneurysm to themselves
―knowing . . . that plaintiff under all the circumstances would not accept‖ the
defendant‘s settlement offer had he been aware of it.148 ―By reason of the
failure of plaintiff‘s counsel to use available rules of discovery,‖ the plaintiff
never properly asked the defendants if they had the relevant information.149 As
a consequence, the parties proceeded to reach an agreed settlement and
obtained approval of the court, while the plaintiff was still in the dark as to his
true medical condition.150 The question in Spaulding was whether this
settlement could later be vacated due to the defense lawyer‘s failure to reveal
the aneurysm.151
The appellate court held that, under these particular circumstances, the
lower court had the discretion (but was not obliged) to vacate the settlement.152
―While no canon of ethics or legal obligation may have required [defense
counsel] to inform plaintiff or his counsel . . . or to advise the court therein,‖
sources of the law, which are more or less equally accessible to all, the parties and the court
typically have widely different abilities to get at the actual facts. Therefore, efforts to distort,
distract from, or otherwise sideline the significance of the material facts of a matter are
particularly pernicious to legal justice.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 124–28.
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2009); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt. e (2000); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97, cmt f (2000).
145. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
146. Id. at 707–08.
147. Id. at 707.
148. Id. at 709.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 708.
151. Id. at 707.
152. Id. at 709.
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their knowledge that the plaintiff was making a unilateral mistake of fact
―opened the way for the court to later exercise its discretion in vacating the
settlement.‖153 In other words, by not volunteering the critically material fact of
the aneurysm, the defense lawyers created a legal vulnerability—that the
settlement might later be declared voidable—but they did not violate any
identified duty.
Although the appellate court was agnostic,154 the lower court was quite
definite on the lawyer‘s duty to volunteer, asserting that defense counsel had no
duty to disclose the aneurysm during the negotiations.155 In saying this,
however, the lower court made an interesting distinction: ―There is no doubt
that during the course of the negotiations, when the parties were in an
adversary relationship, no rule required or duty rested upon defendants or their
representatives to disclose this knowledge.‖156 But when ―the procedure took on
the posture of a joint application [for approval] to the court,‖ that adversary
relationship ceased, at least with respect to ―the facts upon which the Court
could and must approve settlement.‖157 Even then, the lower court did not seem
prepared to go so far as to say the defense lawyers had any general obligation
to disclose, but it did say that, as an ―officer of the Court,‖ counsel had a ―duty
to make full disclosure to the Court‖ when applying for court approval in
settlement proceedings involving a minor.158 In other words, the court felt it
necessary to identify two special features of the case in order to justify
imposing a ―duty‖ to disclose the crucial fact of the aneurysm. First, the
opposing party was a minor. Second, the context was an application to the court
and no longer merely a private negotiation between adversaries.
The idea that lawyers have a higher duty of candor toward courts than
toward adversaries is explicit in the Model Rules. For example, the lawyer‘s
affirmative duty to speak up under Model Rule 4.1(b) (to non-clients other than
courts) is much more limited than the broad duty imposed under Rule 3.3(b) to
―take reasonable remedial measures‖ whenever the lawyer knows that any
person, whether a client or otherwise, intends to engage or does engage in
criminal or fraudulent conduct related to adjudication.159 And the obligations of
candor to the courts apply ―even if compliance requires disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6,‖160 whereas the obligation to
speak to others is specifically limited by Rule 1.6.161 To be sure, the Model
153. Id. at 710.
154. See supra text accompanying note 148.
155. See Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709–10.
156. Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2009). The corresponding range of the
duty to speak under Model Rule 4.1(b) is limited to avoiding assisting the lawyer‘s own clients
in committing crime or fraud. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009).
160. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2009).
161. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2009).
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Rules obligation of candor to the courts may not always be quite as high as the
obligation that applies in disciplinary matters and admissions to the bar,162 nor
is it as high as that exacted in Spaulding,163 but it does occupy a decidedly
higher position than the standards under Rule 4.1 for the benefit of other
lawyers and the public generally. Here again we see a kind of multi-level
hierarchy of candor in the Model Rules, with the lowest level of honesty and
candor owed to other lawyers and the public generally while higher levels are
applicable to bar admissions and disciplinary matters, and to the courts.164
The idea that lawyer honesty means one thing in one context and something
else in another is, perhaps, not entirely easy to accept. A case in which the court
explicitly did not accept it is Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse and Cold
Storage Co.165 The court in Virzi noted how Spaulding condoned defense
counsel‘s omission to mention the aneurysm ―during the course of
negotiations‖ but then recognized that ―a duty to disclose arose once the parties
reached a settlement and sought the court‘s approval.‖166 It also cited a state bar
ethics opinion which declared that a lawyer owes ―an affirmative duty of
absolute candor and frankness to the court which transcends his private
employment [by the client].‖167 From these and other sources, the court
concluded that ―[t]here is no question that plaintiff‘s attorney owed a duty of
candor to this Court.‖168 The court went even further, however, adding that,
―[a]lthough it presents a more difficult judgment call, . . . the same duty of
candor and fairness required a disclosure to opposing counsel, even though
counsel did not ask.‖169 ―The handling of a lawsuit and its progress is not a
game. There is an absolute duty of candor and fairness on the part of counsel to
both the Court and opposing counsel.‖170
The last quoted sentence is a resounding endorsement of what has to be a
basic principle of truly honest lawyering. The problem is that it is hard to
recognize such a principle in the practices of the American adversary system
today. Most lawyers would almost certainly be horrified to hear that they are
ethically subject to an ―absolute duty of candor and fairness‖ to opposing
counsel.171 That would seem to mean, at the very least, that a lawyer is expected
to tell everything that the opponents would likely want to know even if they do
162. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2009).
163. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 710.
164. See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text.
165. 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
166. Id. at 510. As discussed above, the appellate opinion in Spaulding did not explicitly
recognize a ―duty‖ to disclose, though the lower court‘s order appeared to do so. See supra text
accompanying note 156; see also Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 709–10.
167. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 511 (quoting State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Prof‘l and Jud.
Ethics, Formal Op. 142 (1951)).
168. Id. at 512.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
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not ask. No lies, certainly; but must lawyers volunteer information that is
against our client‘s interests? That is not, I think, the way most lawyers believe
they are supposed to practice law.
For all its broad principle, however, Virzi was not, in the context of its
facts, an especially exceptional case. The particular bit of information that the
Virzi lawyer had failed to disclose was that his client was dead.172 And when it
got to its actual holding, the Virzi court became considerably more qualified in
its language, stating that a lawyer ―owes an affirmative duty of candor and
frankness to the Court and to opposing counsel when such a major event as the
death of the plaintiff has taken place.173 This added qualification sharply cuts
down the generous duty of candor that the court seemed to have in mind
elsewhere in its opinion. After all, death is a uniquely ―major‖ event—probably
the most major event that most people personally experience. One is led to
wonder what other events, apart from ―such a significant fact as the death of
one‘s client,‖174 might also trigger the lawyer‘s duty to volunteer information. It
is hardly helpful for a court to say that lawyers have ―an absolute duty of
candor and fairness . . . to both the Court and opposing counsel‖175 if it means a
duty that only applies in the most extraordinary of circumstances.
There is, however, another feature of Virzi that is perhaps even more
troubling from the standpoint of honest lawyering. While the plaintiff‘s death
was certainly significant to the plaintiff, it did not appear to have any
significance at all to the substantive merits of the case.176 The death was not
―caused by injuries related to the lawsuit, and did not have any effect on the
fairness of the . . . award.‖177 Apparently, the only reason the court considered
the death of the plaintiff to be such ―essential information‖ was that the defense
lawyer had expected the plaintiff to be such a strong witness on his own
behalf.178 Thus, although the death did not weaken the plaintiff‘s case, it did
weaken his counsel‘s ability to present that case. By keeping the death a secret,
plaintiff‘s counsel deprived the defense of a strategic advantage—not an
advantage that had anything to do with truth, to be sure, but one that had to do
solely with winning. In other words, the plaintiff‘s lawyer in Virzi was
denounced, not for failing to supply information essential to get at truth, but for
failing to supply information that the other side could use to resist a fair
settlement. Even though the court stated that ―[t]he handling of a lawsuit and its
172. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 508; see GILLERS, supra note 48, at 626 (―Courts have
consistently upheld discipline of lawyers who [fail to reveal] the death of their clients in
litigation.‖ (citing In re Forrest, 730 A.2d 340, 344 (N.J. 1999))).
173. Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
174. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 Reporter‘s
Notes cmt. e (2000) (providing examples of a lawyer‘s duty to volunteer information, though
without setting forth any particular principle to explain them).
175. Virzi, 571 F. Supp. at 512 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 511.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 512.
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progress is not a game,‖179 it treated the withheld information in Virzi precisely
as though a lawsuit is a game, one whose goal is not a ―just‖ result but, instead,
one where each side vies to get the best outcome for itself.
In sum, an exaggerated version of the adversary system can complicate
honesty because complete candor is fundamentally inconsistent with the
conception of the lawyer‘s duty to prevail in the client‘s cause by any means
within the bounds of the law and ethical rules. As part and parcel of this
conception, the lawyer‘s duty to hold back information is not necessarily
limited to protecting or advancing some lawful interest or objective of the
client.180 If the client‘s personal goal is to avoid a prison sentence that the law
prescribes for his act, to escape the obligation of a contract he made, to avoid
paying damages for his tort, or to get out of paying lawful child support, the
attainment of such a goal is presumably the client‘s ―cause‖ for purposes of the
Model Rules.181 And it would be the client‘s cause for most lawyers as well.
This means not only that the lawyer has no duty to volunteer material
information to the other side when it is obviously misinformed, but also that
lawyers must be on the alert to seize advantage from the other side‘s blunders,
or even to argue for interpretations of evidence or agreements that would turn
reasonable past behavior, when viewed in retrospect, into blunders.
IV. A LITTLE PERSPECTIVE: UNITED STATES V. ROGERS
The question of when there is a legal duty to volunteer information is one
that has nagged the law for many decades. The law of fraud is historically based
on misrepresentation as opposed to mere ―non‖-representation.182 In the law of
179. Id.
180. The Model Rules place no explicit limits on the kinds of client‘s ―interests‖ that may
be protected or advanced by lawyer confidentiality. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.
1.6, 3.1 cmt 1 (2009). Although the Restatement says that lawyers need act only to advance the
―lawful‖ objectives of their clients, the limitation to ―lawful‖ was not repeated when it came to
describing the lawyer‘s duties of confidentiality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS §§ 16(1), 60(1)(a) (2000). Instead, the Restatement seems to contemplate that the
lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality applies whenever there is a reasonable prospect that disclosure
will ―adversely affect a material interest of the client‖—whether that interest be a lawful one or
not. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(1)(a) (2000); see infra text
accompanying note 184. Some examples appear in the next sentence in the text. As those
examples should make clear, there are many circumstances in which a client may wish to escape
or evade the behavioral norms, constraints and consequences prescribed by the substance of the
law and, for success, would depend on the lawyer remaining discreet.
181. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 3.1 cmt 1 (2009).
182. See the pre-2002 definition of ―fraud‖ in the Model Rules, which expressly
excluded ―failure to apprise another of relevant information.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT TERMINOLOGY (2001). The classic statement of the fraud concept is from Peek v.
Gurney, where Lord Cairns stated that:
Mere nondisclosure of material facts, however morally censurable, . . . would in my
opinion form no ground for an action in the nature of an action for misrepresentation.
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contracts, a failure to inform another that he or she is making a unilateral
mistake, though once a matter of controversy, is now fairly firmly established,
at least as a basis for rescission.183 Of course, even where there is no legal duty
to speak up, silence may be widely considered to be less than completely
honest.184 Let us assume, however, that when the law regards tricky behavior as
too reprehensible to allow, there is at least a presumption that the behavior is
dishonest.
To supply some perspective, consider the court‘s reasoning in United States
v. Rogers, a case in which the wrongdoer was not a lawyer.185 The defendant in
Rogers went to a bank with a check and told the teller he wanted to deposit part
of it and receive the balance in cash.186 The total amount of the check was
$97.92, and he asked to deposit $80.187 However, the teller misread the check
and placed $1126.59 on the counter, including two strapped packages of
banknotes containing $500 each.188 The defendant picked up the $1126.59 and
departed.189 He was later convicted of bank robbery.190 On appeal, the court
held that the ―proof did support the conviction.‖191
There must, in my opinion, be some active misstatement of fact, or, at all events, such a
partial and fragmentary statement of fact, as that the withholding of that which is not stated
makes that which is stated absolutely false.
Peek v. Gurney, (1873) 6 L.R.E. & I. App. 377, 403; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 161 & cmt. a (1981) (listing the ―special situations‖ in which non-disclosure
can be treated as equivalent to a misrepresentation); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 737–38 (5th ed. 1984).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d (1981).
184. ―A buyer of property, for example, is not ordinarily [legally] expected to disclose
circumstances that make the property more valuable than the seller supposes.‖ RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 cmt. a, 161 cmt. d (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d illus. 10 (1981) (giving as an illustration a land buyer who enters into
the contract without telling the seller that the land contains valuable mineral deposits, according
to a government survey). In a similar vein, the Second Restatement of Torts would appear to
allow persons to take knowing advantage of the ―indolent, inexperienced or ignorant‖ or of
persons whose ―judgment is bad, or [who do] not have access to adequate information.‖
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. k & illus. 6–8 (1977). The persons who take
advantage of others in such situations may have contract rights that are legally safe from
rescission, but how many people would knowingly trust such persons, or regard their sharp
dealing as ―honest‖?
185. 289 F.2d 433, 434 (4th Cir. 1961).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 433–34.
191. Id. at 434. The conviction was, however, reversed and the case remanded because of
an error in the charge to the jury:
The District Court went too far . . . when it told the jury it might convict if, though his
initial receipt of the overpayment was innocent, the defendant thereafter formed the
intention to, and did, convert the overpayment. . . . [C]ases in the United States and in
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What the defendant did in the Rogers case was, to put it bluntly, knowingly
take advantage of another person‘s mistake. The defendant did not ―cause‖ the
blunder; he did not say or do anything to distract the bank teller. He did nothing
to lead her astray or otherwise induce her to err.192 He simply saw that she was
making a material mistake, realized that the mistake was to his advantage, and
then silently availed himself of it. For that, he was guilty of a serious crime.
The pivotal legal question in Rogers was whether the defendant‘s acts
would have constituted common-law larceny—the ―felonious taking and
carrying away [of] the personal goods [o]f another.‖193 This question was
pivotal because, under the relevant subsection of the ―bank robbery act,‖ the
defendant would be guilty only if his actions would have constituted larceny
―as that crime has been defined by the common law.‖194 The court held that the
defendant‘s actions did amount to common-law larceny.195
Now a key point about common-law larceny for present purposes is that it
does not include ―obtaining goods by false pretense.‖196 In other words, the
basis of the defendant‘s guilt was not that he had obtained the money by an
affirmative misrepresentation of any kind. Rather, it sufficed for guilt that the
defendant silently took advantage of another‘s blunder, which he did nothing to
induce. As the court explained:
It has long been recognized, however, that when the transferor acts under a
unilateral mistake of fact, his delivery of a chattel may be ineffective to
transfer title or his right to possession. If the transferee, knowing of the
transferor's mistake, receives the goods with the intention of appropriating

England . . . have consistently held that, if there is a mutual mistake and the recipient is
innocent of wrongful purpose at the time of his initial receipt of the overpayment, its
subsequent conversion by him cannot be larceny.
Id. at 439 (footnotes omitted).
192. At any rate, the court did not think it legally important to mention such additional
facts, if they existed. See id. at 434. They were not necessary for conviction or for the ―larceny‖
theory of the case to apply. Id. at 438.
193. Id. at 438 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Note that the defendant‘s crime did not constitute ―robbery‖ in the conventional
sense because the applicable statutory definition did not require that. Id. at 437. See 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.11, at 438, 445–51 (1986)
(unlawful taking of property by force or intimidation). The essence of the crime was that the
defendant commited larceny. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 437.
194. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 437.
195. Id. at 438. The court remanded the case for retrial with proper jury instructions, but
noted that the evidence presented ―proved the commission of [larceny].‖ Id. at 437–39.
196. Id. at 437. The essence of larceny in the common-law conception is that the ―taking
must be trespassory,‖ that is ―an invasion of the other‘s right to possession.‖ Id. at 438
(emphasis added). If victims are duped by false pretenses into transferring their property
voluntarily, then there is no ―invasion.‖ See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 193, §8.1–2, at 327–
32, 339–40, 342–43.
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them, his receipt and removal of them is a trespass and his offense is
larceny.197

Most non-lawyers would have no difficulty seeing that what Rogers did
was wrong—essentially stealing. To obtain another‘s property by knowingly
exploiting another‘s mistake is larceny even if198 the person taking advantage
did nothing to cause or contribute to the mistake.199 For lawyers, however, it is
a different matter. Lawyers treat the mistakes of others as opportunities, and
seizing on those opportunities is one of the things that lawyers do. It is what
lawyers call ―no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant
facts.‖200
The legal process offers numerous technical opportunities to obtain others‘
property when there is no substantive right to do so. Broadly speaking, such
―robbery under the forms of law‖201 might consist of any effort at shrewdly
gaming the legal process in order to obtain a judgment for money or other
property from a person who has done no wrong. It is not, of course, robbery in
the conventional, technical sense, nor even in the broader sense defined in the
statute applied in United States v. Rogers.202 Persons are not arrested for
committing ―robbery . . . under the forms of law.‖203 They do not serve time.
However, when people enlist the power of government to force innocent others
to part with their property against their will, it would seem at the very least to
be the moral analogue, if not the moral equivalent, of robbery in the more
conventional mode.
Partially, these opportunities to make plays on the legal system and get
something not substantively deserved come about because of the inevitable
imperfections in any institution designed and operated by human beings.204
Partially, they are inherent in the necessary complexities of the substantive rules
and the system that exists to carry them out. Perhaps most of all, however, these
opportunities exist for a reason that is neither inevitable nor necessary, namely
that we largely embrace an exaggerated version of the adversary system, a
version in which no one is personally responsible for getting at the truth and no
197. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 438.
198. Indeed, technically, ―only‖ if. See supra text accompanying note 196.
199. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 437–38.
200. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt 1 (2009).
201. The phrase is borrowed from Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874), where it
was used in reference to a tax. The usage here is from the prevailing argument in a later case,
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 397 (1922), where the phrase was employed to
describe the effect of legislation that cut down private property rights.
202. Id.
203. Loan Ass’n, 87 U.S. at 664.
204. ―All human institutions are imperfect—courts as well as commissions and
legislatures.‖ Chicago, Milwauke & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 465 (1890). ―In
consequence of the imperfection incident to all that is human, wrong may sometimes prevail in
the purest and wisest judicial tribunals . . . .‖ Mt. Airy Ins. Co. v. Doe Law Firm, 668 So.2d
534, 538 (Ala. 1995).
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one is expected to volunteer to correct the misimpressions or mistakes of others.
On the contrary, silently standing by and seizing advantage from others‘
obvious unilateral mistakes is practically endorsed, a seemingly inherent feature
of the lawyer‘s duty of ―zeal in advocacy‖205 and ethical obligation ―to use legal
procedure for the fullest benefit of the client‘s cause‖ within the limits of ―[t]he
law, both procedural and substantive.‖206
The opportunity to get other people‘s property away from them, and to do it
legally, is obviously likely to have its attractions, and those who are so inclined
may seek the assistance of lawyers to aid them in their pursuit of such
―interests.‖ According to the Model Rules, a lawyer is not required to assist a
client with such a ―cause,‖207 but the lawyer is permitted to do so.208
Specifically, the rules state that ―a lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions
concerning the objectives of representation,‖209 and the comments note
(seemingly with approval) that ―lawyers usually defer to the client regarding
such questions as the . . . concern for third person who might be adversely
affected.‖210
For many years I have taught from first-year property casebooks that have
consisted mostly of cases in which somebody was trying to get somebody else‘s
property using the processes of the law. In a significant proportion of these
cases, the basis for the claim was some mistake that had been made somewhere
along the line (as opposed to, say, some wrong or breach of duty on the part of
the defendant). To the naïve eye of a person not inured to the lawyer‘s view of
honesty, these cases might seem like little more than a string of attempts to
exploit legal technicalities or assert unforeseen interpretations in order take
away other people‘s property rights.
As is usual among property professors (it is my guess), I have treated these
standard casebook cases mostly as plain vanilla presentations of property law
problems and of the reasoning that lawyers and courts typically use to resolve
them. I thought nothing of formulating ―Socratic‖ questions that roughly boiled
down to: ―Suppose you represented the plaintiff in this case—what legal
arguments would you make to persuade the court to take the property away
from the defendant and give it to your client?‖
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2009).
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1, cmt. 1 (2009).
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2009); see MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2009).
208. As long as the lawyer stays within the bounds of the procedural and substantive law
and ethical rules: ―[t]he law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within
which an advocate may proceed.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009). I
take this to mean that a lawyer is permitted to invoke legitimate procedural and evidentiary rules
in an effort to defeat a claim that has substantive merit. See supra notes 3 & 17.
209. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009). Otherwise the lawyer should bow
out. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2009) (allowing the lawyer to withdraw if
he or she finds the client‘s intentions ―repugnant‖)
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2009).
205.
206.
207.
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A rich and interesting case that has appeared recently in casebooks is
Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Properties, Inc., a contest over a valuable
building in upper Manhattan.211 The Symphony Space case does not merely
have an outcome that is a bit stunning in its own right, but it is a very useful
teaching case because of the several hypothetical variations that spawn readily
off of it.
IV. SYMPHONY SPACE, INC. V. PERGOLA PROPERTIES, INC.
The case arose out of a moderately complex real estate transaction that was
essentially donative in character.212 In 1978, a representative of Symphony
Space, Inc. approached a Manhattan real estate investor and expressed interest
in using a theater located in one of the investor‘s buildings.213 Symphony Space
was a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to the performing arts.214 The
building in question consisted of approximately 58% theater space; the
remainder was described as commercial space.215 The investor‘s business goal
had been to hold this and several adjacent buildings with a view to selling them
later, after property values in the area increased and the existing commercial
leases had expired.216 Meanwhile, of course, the investor would have to pay the
real estate taxes assessed against the buildings.217 However, as an eligible notfor-profit corporation, Symphony Space was legally entitled to an exemption
from property taxes for the portion of the building that it used.218 Hence, the
plan: The parties agreed that the investor would essentially donate the use of
the theater to Symphony Space.219 As a result, Symphony Space would get a
venue for its performances and other needs at practically no cost, while the
investor would no longer have to pay $30,000 per year of property taxes on the
theater facilities it was donating.220
211. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 800 (N.Y. 1996).
212. Id. at 800–01.
213. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 631 N.Y.S.2d 136, 137 (App. Div.
1995).
214. Id.
215. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800.
216. Id. at 801.
217. Id.
218. Symphony Space, Inc. v. Tishelman, 453 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (N.Y. 1983); see also
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420–a(2) (McKinney Supp. 2009). The Court of Appeals opinion
stated that Symphony Space would receive a tax exemption on the ―entire building,‖ not just the
theater portion. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 801. This would appear, however, to be
contrary to the applicable statute. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420–a(2) (McKinney Supp.
2009). Indeed, in an earlier opinion, the Court of Appeals had made it clear that Symphony
Space had ―not requested tax-exempt status for the remaining part of the property which is used
by a tenant and subtenants for a variety of commercial purposes.‖ Tishelman, 453 N.E.2d at
1095 n.1.
219. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800–01.
220. Id. at 801.
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In order to ensure Symphony Space received the tax exemption to which it
was entitled, the parties structured the donation so that the not-for-profit would
hold the legal title to both the exempt and non-exempt portions of the
building.221 Accordingly, the donor-investor transferred legal ownership of the
theater building to Symphony Space for an essentially nominal price, about
$10,000.222 Of this price, only $10 was paid initially, and the remaining
$10,000 was spread out over twenty-five years, secured by a purchase-money
mortgage.223 Meanwhile, the donor-investor was required to make the payments
on its own mortgage,224 which covered the actual cost of acquiring the space.
As part of the same deal, Symphony Space leased the non-theater portions of
the building back to the donor for $1 per year.225 The upshot of this
arrangement was to give Symphony Space ―virtually cost free‖226 access to the
theater while its benefactor retained use of the commercial parts of the
building.227
In order to provide for the time when the arrangement was to unwind, the
parties made an agreement under which the donor was supposed to have the
right to buy the building back at certain times and on the occurrence of certain
events.228 The buy-back prices under this agreement were roughly equivalent to
the original (nominal) purchase price plus an inflationary increment.229 The
manifest reason for this buy-back agreement was, of course, that it allowed the
donor-investor to get its building back. After all, the donor-investor only
intended to make a ―loan‖ of the theater space, not to give away the whole
building for all time. Everybody involved in the transaction must have
understood that. Otherwise, the buy-back agreement would have made no
221. See N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420–a(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2009); Symphony
Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800–01. Apparently, without this arrangement, the use of the theater
would have cost Symphony Space (or somebody) $30,000 per year in real estate taxes—which,
as a matter of state policy, a not-for-profit like Symphony Space should not have to bear. Cf.
Tishelman, 453 N.E.2d at 1096.
222. See Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800 ($10,010, for a substantial theater plus office
space on upper Broadway in Manhattan).
223. Id. at 801.
224. Id. (in the amount of $243,000).
225. Id. at 800–01.
226. Symphony Space, Inc v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 631 N.Y.S.2d 136, 141 (App. Div.
1995).
227. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 801. Although Symphony Space presumably had to
pay its own operating costs, such as heat and utilities, the donor retained ―certain maintenance
obligations.‖ Id.
228. Id. Essentially, the events consisted of defaults by Symphony Space, either by failing
to make its (relatively small) required payments or failing to allow the investor to retain
possession of the commercial portions of the building. Id. In addition, the donor could opt to
buy back ―at any time . . . during any of the calendar years 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003.‖ Id.
229. The price would rise to a maximum of $28,000 after 25 years. Id. at 800–01. Because
payment of all but $10 of the purchase price was deferred, Symphony Space acquired the use of
the theater space for essentially no out-of-pocket purchase price whatever. Id.
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sense. Years later, however, litigation Symphony Space challenged the validity
of this crucial buy-back agreement,230 and Symphony Space won.231
Saying the case presented a ―novel question,‖232 the Court of Appeals held
that the buy-back agreement was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.233
The novel question was whether New York‘s Rule Against Perpetuities applies
to commercial options, which is what the buy-back agreement created.234 The
court held that it does.235 As a result, the whole building became the permanent
property of Symphony Space, causing its erstwhile owner to suffer a financial
loss of over $20 million.236 In short, by skillful advocacy, the lawyers for
Symphony Space succeeded in scoring a $20 million property interest from an
innocent owner by persuading the court to nullify their client‘s side of a twoway deal.
Now if this were simply a case of an illegal contract, as the Court of
Appeals implied that it was,237 there may have been little cause for concern.
However, the case was not so simple. For even given the court‘s conclusion on
the purely legal issues, it certainly did not follow that it had to defeat the donorinvestor‘s interest in the property and give permanent ownership rights to
Symphony Space.238
230. Id. at 802.
231. Id. Symphony Space prevailed in the trial court on a motion for summary judgment, a
decision that the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 802.
232. Id. at 800.
233. Id.; see also N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS, AND TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 2002)
(―No estate in property shall be valid unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after one or more lives in being at the creation of the estate and any period of gestation
involved.‖).
234. ―This case presents the novel question whether options to purchase commercial
property are exempt from the prohibition against remote vesting embodied in New York‘s Rule
Against Perpetuities.‖ Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800.
235. Id. (―[A]n exception for commercial options finds no support in our law.‖).
236. See id. at 801–02. There had, in the meantime, been a succession in investors when, in
1981, the original donor sold its interest in the properties to the nominee of Pergola Properties.
Id. at 802. Presumably, however, that purchase price appropriately reflected the arrangement for
donation of use. For one thing, Pergola would have assumed that it was acquiring a valid option
to terminate the space-donation arrangement on the agreed terms. Another feature of the
donative arrangement that would have affected the price was that, by providing exemption from
the property taxes, the donative arrangement presumably tended to increase the sale value of the
building (and price to Pergola) by eliminating a substantial cost while sacrificing only a
difficult-to-lease asset, namely, the space configured as a theater. See id. at 800–02.
237. Id. at 809.
238. To be sure, an unremitting Legal Realist might contend that no one could say the
property had ever ―really‖ been the defendant‘s until a court had finally so decided. This is not,
of course, the way most people think about property rights—that all ownership is indeterminate
until adjudicated at law. At any rate, at the time the donation was originally structured, the
plaintiff would almost certainly have agreed that the donor‘s interests under the agreement
amounted to a kind of de facto ―ownership‖ with very substantial value. Indeed, to say the
plaintiff did not view the donor as de facto owner under the original deal would be tantamount
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The argument for Symphony Space had two critical links: First, the
interpretive question of what the parties intended, and, second, the ―novel‖
legal question of whether New York‘s Rule Against Perpetuities applies to
options in commercial transactions.239 Although the court‘s opinion focused
mainly on the novel legal question, that legal question could only come into
play after giving a particular interpretation to the buy-back agreement—an
interpretation that was not necessarily required by its language. In other words,
in order to win, the lawyers for Symphony Space not only needed to
successfully raise a novel question of law, but they also needed to persuade the
court to interpret the agreement in a certain particular way—a way that would
render the agreement void. For even using the rule of substantive law that the
court chose to adopt in answer to the ―novel‖ legal question, the court still
could have reached exactly the opposite ultimate conclusion by interpreting the
agreement differently, thus preserving the rights of the investor. To see this, we
must take a slightly closer look at the buy-back agreement.
As stated earlier, the agreement provided that the investor would be entitled
to buy the building back for an essentially nominal sum at certain times and on
certain events.240 What concerned the Court of Appeals and implicated the Rule
Against Perpetuities was the provision empowering the investor to make an
―election‖ to buy the building back ―at any time‖ during the years 1987, 1993,
1998, and 2003.241 The problem was the last of these four buy-back years,
2003. The last buy-back year was more than twenty-one years following the
creation of the option,242 and this possibility of a post-1999 buy-back is what
implicated the Rule Against Perpetuities.243
Under the particular facts of this case, said the court, ―the perpetuities
period is simply 21 years.‖244 Therefore, the agreement‘s inclusion of the 2003
buy-back year had placed the property under a ―Sword of Damocles‖245 for

to saying that the plaintiff knowingly entrapped the donor in an elaborate con game—pretending
to borrow when, in fact, they meant to keep.
239. See Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 800, 809.
240. Id. at 801.
241. Id. An analogous problem was presented by the fact that the agreement also provided
buy-back rights for certain contingencies that might occur more than twenty-one years after the
agreement was made (e.g., default on the mortgage). Id. at 807. These contingent buy-back
rights, exercisable after twenty-one years, would have been just as invalid as the 2003 buy-back.
Therefore, with respect to them the same crucial interpretive question arises, namely whether
these contingent buy-back rights should be interpreted to be separate options or integral parts of
the same option as the buy-backs that were agreed upon for the years 1987, 1993, and 1998
(which fell within the twenty-one-year perpetuities period). See id. at 807–08.
242. Id. at 801, 806. The option was created in December 1978. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 806. Because the parties to the transaction were corporations, the usual
complicating factor of the Rule Against Perpetuities—so-called ―measuring lives‖—was absent,
leaving only the basic twenty-one-year period as controlling. Id.
245. Id. at 805.
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nearly four years too long.246 Accordingly, said the court, ―the option agreement
is invalid.‖247
While the court‘s resolution of the ―novel‖ perpetuities question may have
been itself a bit of a surprise,248 it did not dispose of the case. In order to say
that the whole buy-back arrangement was invalid under the Rule Against
Perpetuities, the court first had to interpret the parties‘ agreement as creating
only one single option (with several exercise dates and events) rather than a
number of separate options. This was the critical interpretive question in the
case. For if the agreement were interpreted to provide for a number of separate
options, instead of one single option, then only those options exercisable after
twenty-one years would necessarily be void under the Rule. The others,
including the still extant option for 1998, would still be perfectly valid.249
The Court of Appeals pointed to nothing in the parties‘ agreement that
compelled the conclusion that it created only one unitary (and, thus, totally
void) option. For all that appears in its opinion, the Court of Appeals could just
as easily have interpreted the relevant subsection of the buy-back agreement250
as creating four separate options. The first three of these would have been valid
(being exercisable within the twenty-one years) and only the last one not.
However, the interpretation selected by the Court of Appeals was to treat all the
various buy-back rights as one single option, not as a number of separate ones.
It read the parties‘ agreement as creating a single option, which it then promptly
declared to be unenforceable.251 Faced with language that offered at least two
possible interpretations, the Court of Appeals picked the interpretation that
made the buy-back void.

246. Id. at 808.
247. Id.
248. At the time that the buy-back agreement was made, the relevant statutory language
was relatively new and not at all explicit on the question of commercial options. See id. at 803.
At that time, moreover, the cases on which the Court of Appeals relied as interpretive
precedents had not yet been decided. See id. at 803–04 (citing Wildenstein & Co. v. Wallis, 595
N.E.2d 828 (N.Y. 1992); Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Bruken Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379 (N.Y.
1986); Buffalo Seminary v. McCarthy, 451 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 1982), aff’d 447 N.E.2d
76 (N.Y. 1983)). Prior to 1965, the New York Rule Against Perpetuities clearly did not apply to
commercial options. See Buffalo Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 461. The change was effected
(albeit implicitly) by the Legislature‘s adoption, in 1965, of former Real Property Law section
43 (now N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 9–1.1(b) (McKinney 2002)). See Buffalo
Seminary, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
249. The case was decided in 1996 and, therefore, under this interpretation the investor
would have had sufficient time to exercise the 1998 option and avoid the expropriation. See
Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 799.
250. See id. at 801. ―Section 3 of that agreement provides that Broadwest may exercise its
option to purchase the property during any of the following ‗Exercise Periods‘: ‗(a) at any time
after July 1, 1979, so long as the Notice of Election specifies that the Closing is to occur during
any of the calendar years 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 . . . .‘‖ Id.
251. See id. at 808.
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V. REFLECTIONS ON SYMPHONY SPACE
In teaching the ethical dimensions of Symphony Space v. Pergola, the first
thing I stress is that, from all that appears, the lawyers for Symphony Space did
exactly what most lawyers today think lawyers are supposed to do—indeed,
what the current ethical rules seem to require.252 A client came to them because
it was faced with losing a valuable performance space, essential to its mission.
The lawyers‘ job was to protect their client‘s interests, and they set about doing
everything reasonably possible within the legal and ethical boundaries to save
their client‘s possession.253 From the court‘s opinion it is obvious that the
lawyers for Symphony Space argued diligently for the most favorable
interpretation of the existing legal authorities and operative agreements.254 This
is what lawyers do.
Still, the victory in Symphony Space must have felt particularly sweet. The
main goal of the not-for-profit was to save its use of the concert hall.255 But by
an impressive advocacy effort, the lawyers managed not merely to preserve the
right to use the hall but to turn things around to the point where Symphony
Space ended up being declared the outright owner of the whole building. 256
What dedicated advocate, steadfastly loyal to the client‘s best interests, would
not be justly proud of such an outcome?
Yet, there are nagging doubts. Was the case a spectacular victory of justice
over the forces of injustice, or was it, perhaps, something else? The lawyers for
Symphony Space were surely very clever to present the case as a ―novel
question‖ under New York perpetuities law and to persuade the court to
interpret the parties‘ agreement in a way that would make it void. But, is this
the sort of cleverness that redounds to the credit of the legal profession? By
asserting what might easily be regarded as a legal ―technicality,‖257 the lawyers
for Symphony Space won the case, but does that mean the not-for-profit really
was legally entitled to the building in the first place before the case ever came
to court? In other words, did the court merely declare what was already legally
true, that the not-for-profit unqualifiedly owned the building all along? Or is
this a case in which a court was persuaded, in essence, to take property away
from one person and give it to another?

252. See supra text accompanying notes 121–81. Being in New York, the lawyers in this
case were subject to the New York code, based on the American Bar Association‘s Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, rather than the Model Rules. In relevant respects, however, the
two share the same general vision of the adversary system and the lawyer‘s role in it.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 121–81.
254. It does not appear that, in this particular case, the facts were heavily contested but, of
course, in many cases the outcome essentially turns on the ―facts,‖ i.e., the inferences that are
drawn from the raw evidence.
255. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 802.
256. See id. at 809.
257. And the Rule Against Perpetuities is surely a technicality.
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In raising these questions in class, and considering what they might imply
about lawyer ethics, I find it useful to try to fill in the space that lies between
Symphony Space and Rogers, the ―bank robbery‖ case described earlier.258
Obviously, the two cases are different. First, there is every reason to believe
that when the Symphony Space buy-back agreement was originally negotiated,
everybody was acting with the utmost good faith and neither side was looking
for an opportunity to pounce on the other‘s blunder. The mistake (if it can be
called such) was surely a mutual one, with both parties acting in the belief that
the transaction they were structuring would be legally valid and enforceable
according to their understanding.259
There is also another distinction between the two cases. The Symphony
Space case does not present us with a lawyer quietly taking advantage of
another person‘s blunder, as did the defendant in Rogers. Rather, it was a case
of lawyers actively trying to convert another‘s prior choices into blunders, so to
speak, by advocating for conclusions of law and an interpretation of an
agreement that would make the buy-back arrangements something that neither
party originally intended them to be, namely, empty verbiage. This strategy for
getting another‘s property is clearly not fraud (purposefully inducing another‘s
blunder), nor is it the sort of wrong that was condemned in Rogers. It lies
elsewhere on the continuum.
To see the continuum more clearly, and some of the stopping points that lie
along it, let us consider several spin-off hypotheticals from Symphony Space. In
each of these hypothetical cases, it is assumed that the parties have worked out
a tentative agreement similar to the one in the actual case, except that the
tentative agreement provides for only three exercise years: 1987, 1993, and
1998—omitting the fatal exercise year 2003. It is assumed, as well, that it was
already a settled (albeit somewhat obscure) point of law that the local Rule
Against Perpetuities would apply to commercial options.260 At this point in the
negotiations, the several spin-off hypotheticals diverge:
A. Hypothetical 1—Inducing Blunder
Suppose that the lawyers for the not-for-profit proposed inserting 2003 as
an additional buy-back year knowing that 2003 would exceed the perpetuities
period and give their client a solid legal basis for later invalidating the entire
buy-back agreement. They made this proposal in the hope that the other side
258. See supra text accompanying notes 182–211.
259. In Rogers, the Fourth Circuit made clear that it would not be larceny if the defendant‘s
―initial receipt of the overpayment was innocent, [and] the defendant thereafter formed the
intention to, and did, convert the overpayment.‖ United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 439 (4th
Cir. 1961).
260. As previously noted, in the actual case the relevant law consisted of legislation whose
application to options was not at all settled at the time the parties made their agreement, and the
previous law in New York would have clearly not applied to commercial options. See supra
note 248.
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would not notice the perpetuities problem and with the intention of eventually
trying to wrest the whole building from the investor.261
Some students insist that this strategy is perfectly within the ethical bounds
of ―adversary‖ transactional practice. Maybe they are right. Isn‘t it the job of
each lawyer to know the law and to detect such risks to his or her own client?
After all, in the adversary system we are not our brother‘s keepers. My own
conclusion is, however, that deliberately slipping a poison pill into an
agreement with a view to facilitating a later escape from its burdens is
tantamount to fraud. It is exactly the sort of submarine attack or subterranean
tactic that earns the epithet ―shark‖ or ―rat.‖ It is not, at any rate, ―truly honest.‖
B. Hypothetical 2—Quietly Taking Advantage
Now suppose that the lawyers for the donor-investor proposed adding 2003
as a buy-back year, oblivious to the fact that that this would exceed the
perpetuities period and could invalidate the entire buy-back agreement. The
not-for-profit‘s lawyers saw the perpetuities issue but they decided that,
because their client might later want to go for the whole building, they will say
nothing.
This hypothetical is, in my opinion, essentially analogous to Rogers
(certainly so if the not-for-profit in fact later made an effort to expropriate the
whole building). Of course, students who side with the lawyer‘s behavior in the
first hypothetical have no trouble siding with what the lawyer does in this one.
Others are drawn to agree with them, but on the theory that lawyers have no
duty to volunteer—―no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant
facts.‖262 However, it would be my conclusion (partially on the strength of
Rogers) that this sort of game is ethically questionable. If silently taking the
fruits of another‘s blunder can be larceny, I doubt that it can be considered
―truly honest,‖ as well.
C. Hypothetical 3—Turning Another’s Trust into a Blunder
Let‘s go back and suppose again that the lawyers for the not-for-profit
proposed adding 2003 as a buy-back year. However, this time both they and the
lawyers for the donor-investor were oblivious to the risk that adding this
exercise year could jeopardize the validity of the entire buy-back agreement.
The lawyers for the investor accepted the proposal, trusting that it has not been
offered as a trap. Later, in an effort to seize the whole building, the not-forprofit‘s lawyers urge the unexpected interpretation that the buy-back agreement
calls for one single (and, therefore, void) option rather than a number of
separate ones.
261. Perhaps these hypothetical lawyers harbored the realistic hope that real estate
practitioners have only a vague mastery of the Rule Against Perpetuities, which is primarily a
trusts-and-estates rule.
262. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (2009).
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Here, similarly to the actual case, no ethical cloud would lie merely for
unconsciously receiving the advantage. So, the question concerns solely the
propriety of pressing the advantage. This hypothetical bears earmarks of a host
of real life situations in which people make deals, later change their minds, and
then ask their lawyers to pore through the agreement to find some clause or
interpretation of the agreement that will ―get me out of this thing.‖ An ordinary
commercial buyer who wants to get out of a contract with a seller is an
example, though the buyer who wants to keep the goods but not pay for them
may be a bit closer to the facts of Symphony Space.
D. Hypothetical 4—Turning Another’s Reasonable Actions into
Blunders
Suppose finally that the lawyers for the donor-investor proposed adding
2003 as a buy-back year. Both they and the lawyers for the not-for-profit were
oblivious to the risk that adding this exercise year could jeopardize the validity
of the entire buy-back agreement. Later, in an effort to seize the whole building,
the not-for-profit‘s lawyers urge the unexpected interpretation that the buy-back
agreement calls for one single (and, therefore, void) option rather than a
number of separate ones.263
Here again, it is not the unconscious receipt of the advantage but the
conscious decision to press it that raises possible concerns. But perhaps the
ethical concern is justly less than in the preceding hypothetical. After all, in this
example it was the investor who suggested the fatal provision in the first place
and, in both the adversary model and our moral intuitions, people ought to have
some responsibility for what they do, particularly for the results that they
initiate. At any rate, I think that many in the profession today would say that a
lawyer most definitely ought to seek out and take advantage of such openings
inadvertently left by the other side, pursuing them ―for the fullest benefit of the
client‘s cause‖ within the limits of ―[t]he law, both procedural and
substantive.‖264 But would a truly honest lawyer do so?

263. The main differences between the last two hypotheticals and Symphony Space are that,
in Symphony Space (1) we do not know who initially proposed the 2003 buy-back year, and (2)
the relevant law was not merely unknown to the parties but unknowable, since the issue had not
yet been settled at the time of contracting. See supra note 248. See generally Symphony Space,
669 N.E.2d 799. In other words, the parties‘ mistake was not as to the existing state of the law
but as to the future state of the law.
264. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1, cmt. 1 (2009). At the very least, before
depriving the client of this juicy windfall opportunity, the Model Rules would seem to require
that the lawyer communicate and consult with the client, and presumably abide by the client‘s
decision on how to proceed. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) & cmts. 1–2, 1.4
(2009).
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VI. PACTA SUNT SERVANDA?— SHOULD WE LET THE AGREEMENT
STAND?
People write down their agreements in order to achieve an added measure
of security and predictability. Imperfections and ―room for interpretation‖ in
written agreements are rather like money left lying on the dining room table
when guests are in the house. Unfortunately, however, unlike money left on the
table, residual wiggle room in written agreements is virtually unavoidable.
Therefore, imaginative and unexpected interpretations offer a fertile source of
escape for those who regret their contracts. Making such a play on linguistic
vagaries does not require the lawyer to engage in any of the false statements,
misrepresentations, or ―deceit‖ that the Model Rules prohibit.265 Indeed, the
Model Rules may even call for such plays on language as a part of diligent
representation.266 In our exaggerated version of the adversary system, the ―first
great duty of an advocate [is] to reckon everything subordinate to the interests
of his client.‖267 Of course, it is not necessary to question every unexpected or
seemingly imaginative interpretation. Truly honest people can have honest
disagreements. Yet, one has to be troubled when people make deals where the
intentions are clear, and later are able to find lawyers willing to target language
with unforeseen interpretations to get them out of those deals. If the cases like
these have any impact on the reputation of lawyers, it is because they make
honest people feel like prey.
Notice that the question here most emphatically is not concerned with the
lawyer who might find himself caught between what the law permits and what
the lawyer considers to be morally right. A deviation between the law and the
lawyer‘s morality can present a real conundrum.268 But much more common
265. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a), 8.4(c) (2009).
266. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3, 3.1 cmt. 1 (2009).
267. United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 840–41 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Lord Henry
Brougham, with evident disapproval) (alteration in original). The court seemed more attracted to
the riposte of Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn who responded, ―to loud cheers from the
distinguished assembly‖:
[t]he arms which an advocate wields he ought to use as a warrior, not as an assassin. He
ought to uphold the interests of his clients per fas, not per nefas. He ought to know how to
reconcile the interests of his clients with the eternal interests of truth and justice.
Id. (alteration in original).
268. See generally Jane B. Baron & Richard K Greenstein, Constructing the Field of
Professional Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 37 (2001) (describing
how the construction of legal ethics curriculum in law schools can promote a separation
between legal ethics and moral reasoning); Stephen Gillers, Can a Good Lawyer be a Bad
Person?, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS 131 (1999) (noting that the institutional role of
lawyers often requires them to place their clients‘ interests above that of others, rather than
simply exercise moral reasoning); David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN.
L. REV. 873 (1999) (exploring the choice between law-centered and morality-centered theory in
deciding what is the best approach to legal ethics); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005) (using memoranda on torture in
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(and less discussed) is the conundrum presented by the everyday deviation that
lawyers find between what the law intends and what the client wants. The
person who commits a tort does not want to lose his home or assets to pay
damages. The heir who is cut out of a will does not want to settle for merely a
token legacy. The promisor who finds a contract burdensome does not want to
compensate the other party for nonperformance. And so it goes for an infinitude
of everyday legal ―problems‖ that arise when people do things but do not wish
to endure the consequences that the law prescribes. But is it the role of honest
lawyers to hold themselves out as being there to ―solve‖ these problems by
helping people escape the consequences and limitations that the substance of
the law means to impose?
The potential for deviation between what the legal system can be led to
permit and what the substantive law affirms as ―justice‖ is a focal point of
much legal representation. By carefully working the evidence, inventively
interpreting documents, and making clever use of the procedural possibilities,
smart lawyers can help their clients avoid what the law intends for them. That is
to say, the intricacies, inertias, and costs of the legal process lead to
imperfections of operation, and skillful advocates can make deliberate plays on
these imperfections with a view to making the process misfire or leading the
law astray.269
Quite possibly, most lawyers today would accept without qualm that it is
perfectly all right to press for interpretations of agreements that are in their
clients‘ current interests, even if different from their clients‘ original intentions.
Nevertheless, there is something in that view that seems to be counter to the
very concept of ―agreement,‖ and marks an important difference between a
―truly honest‖ lawyer and a merely ―ethical‖ one (in the Model Rules sense).
The truly honest lawyer would never urge an interpretation of a contract with
the deliberate objective of frustrating the agreed exchange that both parties
manifestly had in mind.
Sometimes, of course, it will not be at all obvious exactly what the parties
had in mind. As noted earlier, even the truly honest can have honest
disagreements. In Symphony Space, for example, one may reasonably doubt
that the parties ever had any actual contractual intentions on the question of
whether the buy-back arrangement consisted of one single option or a number
of separate ones. But such considerations are not always sufficient to dispose of
a consideration of how lawyers can manipulate the law to overcome legal norms); W. Bradley
Wendel, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J. 667 (2001) (reviewing ARTHUR
ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)).
269. As Professor William Simon has rather delicatedly put it: ―[E]ven in a relatively
reliable procedure, the lawyer typically has opportunities to improve her client‘s chances of
success in ways that do no facilitate decision on the merits by the adjudicator.‖ WILLIAM H.
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS‘ ETHICS 143 (1998). For my own
discussion at greater length of some more specific strategies, see generally Humbach, supra note
7, at 1 (discussing abuse of confidentiality rules and the deliberate fabrication of controversy).
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the question. The parties in Symphony Space may well not have had any real
―intention‖ on the specific (and rather technical) single-option/multiple-options
issue. But the lawyers for the not-for-profit could not have have been unaware
that the investor never intended to give away completely a piece of property
worth $20 million.
According to the standards of today‘s exaggeratedly adversarial legal
culture, one should praise the Symphony Space lawyers for advocating as they
did. They had a client who had a big problem. They pursued what was, quite
likely, the only really promising avenue for protecting their client‘s interests—
asserting a ―novel question‖ of law and an unexpected interpretation of the
relevant agreement.270 The client retained them to find a way to save its use of
the concert hall, and the lawyers considered it their job to find one, ―defer[ring]
to the client regarding such questions as the . . . concern for third persons who
might be adversely affected.‖271
There remains, however, a legitimate question as to what ought to be the
standards of the profession as a whole. When a client comes in and says, ―I‘ve
made this contract and now I wish I hadn‘t,‖ or ―they say we‘re in breach and
want to hold us liable,‖ what is the lawyer to do? Should not one of the first
questions that the lawyer asks herself be: ―Is the contract valid? Can I find
some legal way that it won‘t be enforced?‖ As noted earlier, the Model Rules
are instinct with the idea that, in our adversary system, if there is a legal way to
win, then winning must be right.272 And, it needs to be said, the lawyers for
Symphony Space did win.273

270. That is to say, faced with the law as it was, the lawyers for Symphony Space may have
had no realistic choice but either to throw in the towel—give up the theater—or go for the
whole thing via the Rule Against Perpetuities. If their choices were thusly limited, of course, it
would be a reproach to the state of the law, but if the lawyers saw no way to produce a ―just‖
result, and had only a choice between two unjust ones, they can hardly be criticized for choosing
the side of their own client.
271. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2009).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 124–28.
273. Perhaps the most astounding thing, at least for persons unaccustomed to the
convoluted ideas that lawyers have about justice, is not that the lawyers argued that the ―buyback‖ was invalid, but that the Court of Appeals agreed. The court showed no regret or doubt
about the forced expropriation and, on the contrary, offered a long explanation as to why it was
legally right to take away the investor‘s property interest and give the whole building to
Symphony Space. See Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Prop., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 809 (N.Y.
1996). By not taking notice of the separate-option interpretation, the court produced a line of
reasoning which, every step of the way, seems eminently logical and firmly grounded in both
law and policy, leading to a conclusion which, simply put, the law seems to require. Id.
Unfortunately, that is no guarantee of soundness. Persuasive arguments can be produced by
skillful rhetoricians on both sides of almost any seriously contended case. As Jonathan Swift
once reminded us, tweaking our profession with irony, lawyers have ―the Art of Proving by
Words multiplied for the Purpose, that White is Black, and Black is White.‖ JONATHAN SWIFT,
GULLIVER‘S TRAVELS 227 (Christopher Fox ed., Bedford Books St. Martin‘s Press 1995) (1726).
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Certainly, by one measure, victory is its own justification, and a legal
victory left unrealized is like a ripe fruit left unpicked. However, the problem
with treating victory as its own justification is that, if taken to its logical
conclusion, nobody‘s property is safe as long as there is a sharp-eyed lawyer
out there clever enough to figure out how to get it. For what skilled advocate
cannot always think up some novel question of law or devise some unforeseen
interpretation of an agreement? Is there any substantial chain of title that does
not include at least one crucial deed or other link which, with a little imagination, cannot be robustly challenged—or, at least, cast in enough of a shadow to
pry loose a substantial settlement? And what can be said of the vulnerability of
property rights applies to all rights. This is not a question of a few charlatans
but of highly principled advocates who, in loyal service to their clients‘
interests, pore through documents, records, testimony, and laws looking for
ways to win.
VII. CLOSING THOUGHTS
The legal process is unfortunately not perfect and, as a human institution, it
never can be. It will always be possible that the process will make mistakes,
producing outcomes that the substance of the law is not meant to produce. But
the fact that mistakes can happen does not mean it is all right for lawyers to try
to make them happen. It is not necessarily all right to get somebody else‘s
property away from them, or to defeat their ―rights,‖ just because you can.
The ultimate question is: What counts as legal justice? Is it that which the
substance of the law prescribes, or is it whatever result the legal process can be
led to produce? It may be inevitable that the law‘s burden will be different for
some people than it is for others. It may be that there will always be one set of
rules for ordinary folks, who are simply expected to obey, while something
else—something less burdensome—applies for those able to hire lawyers to
engineer their escapes. Even if this divergence may be in some degree
inevitable, however, it does not follow that it ought to be condoned, much less
left a wide area to flourish as it is under the Model Rules. Discrepancies
between legal outcomes and substantive justice erode the basis for public
confidence in the Rule of Law. Justice should not be divided—one thing for
some, another for others—all contingent on the lawyer‘s acumen and skill. In a
world of truly honest lawyers, it would not be.

